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ABSTRACT
To effectively prevent and mitigate the outbreak of natural disasters is a more pressing issue in
the twenty-first century than ever before. The frequency and cost of natural disasters is rising
globally, most especially in developing countries where the most severe effects of climate
change are felt. However, while climate change is indeed a strong force impacting the severity of
contemporary catastrophes, it is not directly responsible for the exorbitant cost of the damage
and suffering incurred from natural disasters -- both financially and in terms of human life.
Rather, the true root causes of natural disasters lie within the power systems at play in any given
society when these regions come into contact with a hazard event. Historic processes of isolation,
oppression, and exploitation, combined with contemporary international power systems, interact
in complex ways to affect different socioeconomic classes distinctly. The result is to create
vulnerability and scarcity among the most defenseless communities. These processes affect a
society’s ideological orientation and their cultural norms, empowering some while isolating
others. When the resulting dynamic socio-political pressures and root causes come into contact
with a natural hazard, a disaster is likely to follow due to the high vulnerability of certain groups
and their inability to adapt as conditions change. In this light, the following discussion exposes
the anthropogenic roots of natural disasters by conducting a detailed case analysis of natural
disasters in Haiti, Ethiopia, and Nepal.
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Chapter One: Vulnerability and Natural Disasters in the 21st Century

Natural disasters are among the greatest threats to humanity in the twenty-first century.
People of different cultures and nations are increasingly affected by climate change and
vulnerable to the consequences of severe environmental hazards. However, history has illustrated
that the negative impacts of events such as famine, floods, disease epidemics, hurricanes, or
earthquakes are not felt equally by populations residing in the regions hit. The ability for many
individuals, especially in less developed countries (LDCs), to successfully adapt to the crises
repeatedly appearing in the media is determined predominantly by the ways people are able to
express their needs and opinions towards government. Social, political, and economic factors are
largely what determine how people structure their lives -- not the natural environment. In this
sense, natural disasters are the result of two factors: the political, social, and economic processes
of exclusion and marginalization rooted within a region’s history, on the one hand, and the
immediate impact of the environmental hazard itself on the other.1 As a means of explaining the
causes of disasters, one must look beyond the environmental triggers of a crisis, instead
dissecting the socio-political systems, both domestic and international, that create people’s
vulnerability to disasters in the first place. If the international community is to effectively
address the prominence of natural disasters in the modern era, disaster analysis must
acknowledge that these crises are never purely natural occurrences. Rather, they are deeply
embedded within the power structures of international relations and diminish people’s resilience
to environmental shocks or hazards in dynamic ways.

1

Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and
Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 22.
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Globalization has indeed proven a powerful force in promoting human development, yet
it has also generated a great amount of risk and vulnerability in the daily lives of many
communities. People are increasingly moving between borders and countries are becoming more
interdependent. Mass migration and urbanization are the product of different social and political
environments, and these prompt trans-national vulnerabilities which are only exacerbated by
environmental degradation and climate change. For example, at the turn of the twenty-first
century, ethnic strife and battles over lucrative mineral resources tore apart the Congo, Sudan,
South Sudan, and Darfur, displacing millions of people. These politically and economically
rooted conflicts forced innumerable individuals to suffer from chronic malnutrition, physical
displacement, as well as various biological diseases including cholera and HIV/AIDS. Every
day, families across the world are resettling to urban centers in search of work. Rapid
urbanization and unregulated development is putting a rising number of people at risk, something
which the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India indicates. This single quake killed approximately
18,000 people, injured another 167,000 and destroyed nearly 400,000 homes.2 Such are
outcomes predominantly based in patterns of urban settlement -- not in the nature of the quake
itself.
The political, social, and economic frameworks within which different groups of people
exist determine how they interact with their environment. Some may, due to financial
circumstances, be forced to inhabit regions of high-susceptibility to disaster, while others may
have to accept a physically dangerous job without health care compensation to enhance family
incomes. In these instances, the risks involved in people’s daily lives are directly influenced by

2

K. Sudhir, Jain et. al., The Republic Day Earthquake in the land of M. K. Gandhi, The Father of the Nation
(Kanpur: Department of Civil Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, 2001). Available at:
https://www.nicee.org/Bhuj.php Accessed: September 8, 2016.
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the political, social, and economic constraints placed upon them through historic processes of
exclusion and exploitation.
By comprehending how power and agency may shape a community struck by disaster,
one acquires a deeper appreciation for the socio-political root causes of people’s vulnerability to
disaster. Colonialism is one of the greatest examples of such processes. The institution has
engendered both past political trends and even the current ideologies and prejudices inherent to a
community. Vulnerability is thus centuries in the making. Colonialism creates clear historical
consequences that constrain different communities’ potential for economic stability, ultimately
limiting the capacity of oppressed and marginalized demographics to adapt under modern
environmental crises.
The 1975 earthquake in Guatemala City is just one illustration of this insight. Here,
colonial practices of indigenous exclusion and persecution forced the native populations into a
state of abject poverty. Severe discrimination and marginalization against the indigenous lasted
far beyond the colonial era, however, and this caused a majority of indigenous Guatemalans to
settle into shantytown hamlets along eroded, dangerous terrain.3 Naturally, it was this region that
suffered the worst damages from the quake. Such histories illustrate why disaster analysis must
acknowledge how vulnerability is structured through people’s mundane daily existence.
Systematic interactions between social, environmental, political, economic, and institutional
actors play an integral part in defining the allocation and distribution of resources across society
through a diverse chain of temporal and geographic spheres.4

3

P. Susman, P. O'Keefe, and B. Wisner, “Global disasters, a radical interpretation,” In Interpretations of Calamity
from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology, ed. K. Hewitt (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 263-283.
4
Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and
Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 2-15.
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For the purposes of the following discussion, vulnerability is defined as the sociallyconstructed risk of a population, itself the result of myriad interactions between political, social,
and economic elements of history. The term natural disaster represents the combined effects of
natural hazards (the storm, earthquake, etc.) upon a demographic region of high risk and
insecurity. The all-encompassing occurrences of a disaster engulf various aspects of human life,
affecting the environmental, social, economic, political and biological conditions of a community
in dynamic ways. A population’s vulnerability to disasters is thus a pivotal concept in
ideologically translating the multidimensionality of disaster into concrete circumstances of life.
By viewing disasters through this lens, one may begin to assess the processes which precipitate
such outcomes in order to delineate policy proposals for both the prevention and mitigation of
future disasters.
To this day, the Irish Potato Famine is an exceptional illustration of how a society’s
underlying cultural orientation creates the preconditions necessary for a disaster to strike. During
the mid 19th century, the Irish population were required to produce exclusively one variety of
potato under oppressive British rule. However, compulsory monocrop production left many Irish
citizens with little financial capital and limited livelihood opportunities. When a vicious disease
decimated the potato crops over a period of years, the Irish were left to starve. A famine resulted,
due to the fact that few other crops were produced domestically under the mono-cropping policy,
and also since the British prevented food aid from entering the region.5 In the end, 1.5 million
Irish died and an additional two million emigrated, representing one of the worst famines in
recorded history. This event exposes the explicitly political and economic nature of the disaster,
as it was precipitated by British biases against Irish citizens and the subsequent marginalization

5

Mark Thornton, "What Caused the Irish Potato Famine?," The Free Market, May 20, 2008. Accessed August 29,
2016.
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of the Irish people. Under different socio-political circumstances, the Irish populations which
perished in the famine would likely have lived longer and enjoyed a better quality of life. In this
sense, culturally-specific forms of discrimination surrounding the allocation of welfare or relief
are highly influential in exacerbating the consequences of a natural hazard to cause full-scale
disasters.
Even so, a complex array of factors, many of which are overlapping and interdependent,
each play a decisive role in determining how individuals and communities can choose to respond
to the outbreak of an environmental crisis. The creation of popular vulnerability to disaster is a
multilevel and multi-scalar process, the roots of which lie in the trans-generational oppression,
inequalities, and marginalization of a community. In many ways, the same social and cultural
processes that give rise to vulnerability are enmeshed within the broader international economic
and political systems of capitalism and globalization.6 Examples of such concepts include: the
Native American tribes residing near abandoned uranium mines in the United States, the
indigenous Amazonian tribes who are currently facing the consequences of careless oil dumping
by Texaco, or the millions of central Africans who are daily terrorized by armed warlords
seeking to dominate lucrative mineral trades -- to name a few. The economic institutions of the
Western marketplace often create insecure access to some of the most vital resources amongst
the marginalized and impoverished communities of underdeveloped nations, creating ample
space for conflict and exploitation.
This is especially the case in regards to goods such as clean water. On a global scale, the
rapidly accelerating commodification of water has led many to argue that such is a human right
and should not be considered an economic good, since the market forces of capitalism are not

6

Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability, and
Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 23-24.
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sufficient to guarantee the commodity’s resilience under the outbreak of a natural hazard. By
turning water into a private good, property rights and market mechanisms only guarantee access
to clean water for those who can afford to pay a premium. Even so, under disaster conditions
access to clean water becomes highly unpredictable -- even for the upper classes with the
financial means to acquire it.
Such was the case in Egypt during the late 19th century, when malaria spread rapidly
through the British-engineered irrigation channels that allocated “premium” water to the sugar
and cotton plantations of the Upper Nile. Although designed to maximize economic efficiency
and serve private enterprise in the region, the Nile River control projects also enabled malaria
infected mosquitos to easily jump between barriers, taking advantage of the recent irrigation
works that changed patterns of water use and inadvertently made the disease more transmittable.7
Combined, drought and the wartime lack of nitrate fertilizer around the Nile basin created a
politically-based famine which, when combined with the modern irrigation systems of privatized
water, led to the death of over 600,000 individuals.8
The political ecology of land rights and notions of property ownership are also crucial to
understanding the vulnerabilities of certain populations to disasters. In many rural and
developing regions across the globe, land is the primary means of production used to generate a
family’s income. For these communities, land is also the main asset that farmers have to
accumulate wealth and transfer it to future generations.9 In order to industrialize economic

7

Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002).
8
Ibid.
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B. Nega, B. Adenew and S. Gebre Sellasie, Current Land Policy Issues in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian
Economic Policy Research Institute, 2003), 103-124.
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output, however, governments will often redefine patterns of land distribution and accessibility
rights, reducing the livelihood security of many pastoral communities.
Such is the current situation of the majority Oromo population in Ethiopia, whereby
recent government development programs have been met by peaceful protests against the
widespread displacement of Oromo farmers. In this instance, the ability for Oromo villages to
access the lands and waterways which have been worked by their families for generations is
being restricted by the state without adequate compensation. The Ethiopian government
conducted these land grabs as part of the Addis Ababa Master Plan, which initially promised to
bring great economic growth to the region through industrialization and foreign direct
investment. Although the Plan has indeed boosted GDP growth substantially, it is very unpopular
amongst rural peasants.10 Economic growth in Ethiopia has come at the expense of traditional
land tenure practices. This led to great insecurity surrounding Oromo livelihoods by preventing
large parts of the population from conducting their traditional forms of pastoral agriculture. One
outcome of the Oromo’s destitution has been an excessive increase in the group’s vulnerability to
hazards such as drought or disease. The usurpation of traditionally communal farmlands has
overturned prior notions of land access and entitlement, severely restricting the Oromo’s ability
to bring their herds to the fields and lakes upon which they have relied for centuries. Thousands
of villages are left increasingly vulnerable to disasters, while the government’s violent
crackdown in response to the protests has created poignant civil unrest. An increasing number of
people have fled Ethiopia and sought refuge in neighboring African countries such as Malawi or
Sudan.11 Yet, the changing movements of mass numbers of people, especially under the

10

Felix Horne, Such a Brutal Crackdown -- Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 2016).
11
This information was gathered during interviews conducted with Felix Horne of Human Rights Watch and Bonnie
Holcomb of the Oromo Studies Association between June 1, 2016 and August 5, 2016.
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conditions of violent warfare felt throughout the central and east African region, exacerbates the
transmission of disease epidemics and people’s vulnerability to disasters; thousands have died
while many others have become stateless refugees.
The instances cited above illustrate how the resource allocation patterns of any given
society are central to determining a people’s vulnerability to disaster. These patterns are
expressions of the dominant ideologies which govern international mediation between the
society concerned and government.12 Practices of resource distribution indicate where, when,
how, and to whom goods and services (including social capital) are allocated. Those affected by
a hazard face less risk and vulnerability to disaster when more of society’s resources are easily
accessible. Therefore, political and economic power interact with social customs and cultural
tradition to constrain the array of livelihood opportunities and coping mechanisms available to
different groups or individuals at any given time. People who are viewed with negative social
biases, who are of a marginalized identity, or of a low-income bracket, face restricted access to
resources and capital. Such status limits their capacity to cope when the outbreak of an
environmental hazard strikes and inevitably propels a community’s experience of natural hazards
(a hurricane, flood, drought, etc.) from a state of severe weather to a crisis-level disaster. This is
especially the case for people with little political or economic influence in society, like the
indigenous groups of the Guatemalan highlands, residents of Brazil’s informal favela
communities, or any of the 65.3 million displaced refugees around the world.13 Such individuals
wield less power to demand assistance when needed, being both disenfranchised, marginalized,
and many even stateless. They are also often forced to also accept risky or unsafe living
12

Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and Dorothea Hilhorst, Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development, and People
(London: Earthscan, 2004), 2.
13
Adrian Edwards, “Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High,” UNHCR News, June 20, 2016. Accessed on 09
September 2016.
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html
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conditions due to lack of education or out of financial necessity. The divergence in various socioeconomic classes’ access to social goods and material resources alter the opportunities they face
to improve their livelihood and diminish overall risk to disasters.
One potent illustration of this phenomena, the effects of which are still apparent to this
day, lies within the communities most gravely affected by Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 5.8
million people lived in the areas struck hardest by the hurricane, and more than one million of
these individuals lived in poverty prior to the hurricane’s onset.14 Those who suffered most were
families who, due to economic constraints, could not easily adapt or cope with the unexpected
changes to their environment. US census data confirms that African Americans made up a
disproportionate share of the hurricane’s victims: about one in three people who lived in the
areas hit hardest by the hurricane were African American.15 Further analysis also indicates that
thirty-five percent of black households in New Orleans, and nearly sixty percent of poor black
households, lacked a vehicle with which to evacuate.16 This data exposes the embedded racial
constraints of American culture, forcing certain demographics to have no choice but accept
riskier living conditions and fewer economic opportunities -- the consequences of which are
clearly greater vulnerability to natural disasters.
Contrastingly, families hit by Katrina who were well educated, and therefore held wellpaying jobs, could afford to hurricane proof their homes and evacuate the area immediately when
notified of a severe hurricane warning. Of all the white non-Hispanic households in New
Orleans, only 15 percent lacked a vehicle.17 While many families held savings accounts and
14

Arloc Sherman and Isaac Shapiro, Essential Facts About the Victims of Hurricane Katrina (New York, NY:
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2005).
15
Ibid.
16
US Census Bureau, Federal Emergency Management Assistance in 2000 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2000).
www.censtats.census.gov/data/LA/04022.pdf . Note: designated "Black or African American” includes individuals
who specified more than one race.
17
Ibid.

15
insurance agreements which gave them the financial support necessary to recover from Katrina,
those on fixed incomes often lost their livelihoods and all assets in the storm. With Hurricane
Katrina in mind, it becomes clear how natural disasters are defined by the underlying social,
political, and economic forces of a community. These factors figure centrally in creating crisislevel outcomes. The effects of such dynamic socio-political pressures affect populations across
the world, in developed nations as much as in LDCs, for social inequality and marginalization
are traits inherent to every nation state, no matter how big or small.
In this sense, it is important to understand that environmental hazards are naturally
occurring events, while disasters are not. Disasters, rather, are the complex physical
manifestation of underlying social, political, and economic inequalities (such as irregular urban
settlements and weak regulatory practices) that render a society less resilient to shocks from
hazards.18 Such inequalities often times force people to also accept unsafe and unsanitary living
conditions. The result of such trends is to exacerbate the destructive effects of a hazard -- both as
it occurs and throughout the process of recovery -- heightening the vulnerability of the
marginalized or low-income populations affected. Such is especially the case in economically
and politically underdeveloped states whose governments lack the capacity to respond or to
implement institutional forms of civilian support and security. Therefore, multiple factors are
central to assessing a people’s risk and vulnerability in relation to disaster: where they live and
work, the level of government protection from hazards, collective preparedness to address
environmental threats, the knowledge base of a community, as well as an individual or
population’s wealth, class, gender, age, ethnicity, migrant status, and overall health. Many more

18

Dorothea Hilhorst and Greg Bankoff, "Theorizing Vulnerability in a Globalized World: A Political Ecological
Perspective," in Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development, and People, eds. Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and
Dorothea Hilhorst (London: Earthscan, 2004), 2-3.
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conditions also determine the severity of risk and vulnerability which people face, and each of
these elements plays a dynamic, interdependent role with others to generate the modern disasters
we see today.
As the Red Cross exposed in the World Disasters Report 2001, the impact of extreme
natural events upon countries with high, medium, and low scores on the Human Development
Index (HDI) is indicative of how a people’s vulnerability to disaster correlates with their access
to society’s goods and resources. The HDI is a marker of development which emphasizes that
people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a
country, not economic growth alone. As such, the HDI provides a summarized measurement of a
nation’s average achievement in key dimensions of human development. These include: living a
long and healthy life, being well-educated, and having a decent standard of living. It is important
to note, however, that the HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development
entails. Therefore, it is a tool to gain insight rather than a clear marker of regional vulnerability
and levels of development. The HDI does not reflect upon inequalities, poverty, human security,
or empowerment, but rather offers other composite indices as a broader proxy on some of the
key issues of human development, inequality, gender disparity, and human poverty.19 As a
conceptual tool, the HDI can thus be used to question national policy choices: how can two
countries with the same level of gross national income (GNI) per capita end up with grossly
different human development outcomes?
As the 2001 UNDP report indicates, extreme environmental hazards which triggered the
deadliest natural disasters across the world were experienced predominantly in countries with
low HDI scores (approximately two thirds of all deaths from hazards reported between 1991 and

19

United Nations Development Program, UNDP Human Development Reports (Geneva: United Nations
Development Program, 2015). Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi
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2000). In the last decade of the 20th century, approximately 2,557 natural disasters were reported
to the UN, and more than half were in countries of medium human development (MHD).20
However, two-thirds of all deaths reported to the UN during this timeframe came from countries
of low human development (LHD), and only two percent came from highly developed nations.21
Clearly, there is a recurring divergence between the hazards reported and the casualties incurred
amongst LHD, MHD, and developed states.
It also important to note that the for the purposes of this report, the United Nations
categorized both China and India as medium development countries. Yet these states each
experience high levels of inequality, poverty, and environmental insecurity; in various ways
India and China are subject to many of the same demographic and environmental instabilities of
LHD states. While both states are considered MHD countries by UN standards, World Bank
Data confirms that a vast portion of both countries’ populations are politically marginalized and
suffer from severe poverty as well as poor access to healthcare and education.22 Combined, these
constraints indicate that the populous, low income communities of India and China may often
reside in regions of high risk to environmental catastrophe. These people are the most vulnerable
to disasters due to their disenfranchisement, marginalization, and economic insecurity. The
irrefutable correlation between low HDI scores and a population’s vulnerability to disasters
highlights why disaster analysis must acknowledge the prominent role of social and political
forces in exposing people to risk and making them more vulnerable to disasters. It is essential to

20
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remember that disasters are the result of social environments, resource allocation, and the
sustainability of livelihoods among the parties affected by hazards.
Cases such as China or India also demonstrate that an individual or community's relative
vulnerability to disaster is as much the result of people’s access to social and material resources
as it is a function of how dominant power structures in society manipulate access to these goods.
Such resources may include, but are not limited to: adequate health care, proper sanitation,
communication and transport infrastructure, as well as education. On the macro level, the role of
the national government in providing a supportive welfare system and the proper disaster
mitigation measures is an essential component in determining the risk and vulnerability of any
given community. Countries with a more developed infrastructure and welfare support system
(such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, or Germany) have equipped their citizens with the
resources necessary to diminish vulnerability to disasters, allowing for successful adaptation
should a hazard strike. In less developed countries, however (like the Congo, Haiti, Guatemala,
or Nepal), the state apparatus lacks the means to provide its citizens with this sort of security and
support. As a consequence, their citizens of underdeveloped states are often forced to accept
riskier livelihood conditions and face situations of greater vulnerability.
Therefore, the prominent correlation between the political and economic instabilities of
LDCs and a population’s greater overall vulnerability to disasters can be attributed to
inconsistencies of the state regarding resource provisions and upholding human rights. Divergent
regional policies surrounding people’s access and entitlements to resources and social goods,
many of which are influenced by global capitalism and the residual elements of colonial policies,
inevitably mean that the effects of a severe drought will vary from relatively little impact in some
areas to extreme suffering in others. Pockets of regional vulnerability are difficult to detect,

19
however, since such processes and conditions most significantly affect small and isolated
communities.23 The complexity of natural disasters arising from such a situation inevitably
means that in order to ensure the successful recovery and the future protection of affected
communities, sectoral needs at the local, district, and national levels must be acknowledged by
domestic as well as international actors and revised accordingly. This would allow for
appropriate government agencies to address the needs of their citizens -- assuming that the state
has resources to provide such infrastructure in the first place. The absence of such support
mechanisms often produces slum dwellings, poor rule of law, and generally less respect for the
state apparatus, as there is poor communication between citizens and government. Faltering
governments often lead to societies of unsafe environmental conditions, corruption, excessive
economic insecurity surrounding peoples’ livelihoods, and recurring outbreaks of violence or
biological epidemics due to high levels of migration and environmental degradation.
Unless one is capable of understanding the historically-embedded root causes and
broader social patterns that precipitate economic inequality, unsafe living conditions, and
poignant political marginalization, it will be impossible to effectively develop a means of
addressing natural disasters in the twenty-first century. One must analyze not only disasters in
general, but rather go a step further and dissect the underlying forces that make people and their
environment vulnerable to such crises in the first place. Countries must work to identify and
address the broad range of needs that their citizens demand on both a micro and macro level,
while also enhancing communication and coordination between people and government to
ensure needs are met. This must be done at the local, regional and national level, while also
taking into account the poignant effects of globalization. Disasters cannot be artificially
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separated from the functionings of normal, everyday society, for such factors are inherent to the
escalation of hazards into disasters. The risks and constraints placed upon an individual’s daily
life expose how disasters are created by compounding the effects of a trigger event (the hazard)
within the underlying vulnerabilities of a society, as they are produced through temporal,
regional, and international spheres of influence.
However, vulnerability is more than a concept to be identified with poverty.
Impoverishment alone is not sufficient to generate the complex array of social, political, and
economic conditions that precipitate vulnerability to disaster. Other factors deeply embedded
within the political economy and ideological views of a community are actually the strongest
determinants of vulnerability in any given community. While it is true that populations who
suffer from poverty, resource depletion, and marginalization are generally more vulnerable and
face greater risk to disasters, one cannot declare a direct causation between poverty and a
people’s vulnerability.
This contention is clearly illustrated by the status of favela communities throughout Rio
de Janeiro. Favelados are indeed impoverished, yet their vulnerability is a product of their
marginality and disenfranchisement rather than a direct lack of financial capital. In Rio de
Janeiro, a multi-generational history of economic necessity has forced favela residents to
construct shantytowns in the city’s treacherous slopes and hillsides. The history of Rio’s favelas
date back to the 1940s when migrant workers from the northern regions of Brazil came to the
city during an era of widespread industrialization.24 These workers provided the main source of
labor to construct the city that exists today. However, due to housing shortages, workers were

24
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forced to take residence in the hillsides of the city, building illegal settlements that the
government was incapable of regulating.25
To this day, the relationship between Rio’s favelas, which currently house approximately
twenty-five percent of the city’s population (1.5 million people), and the municipal government
is tenuous. Favelados still lack many of the legal entitlements of citizenship. As of July 2015, a
total of 77,206 people have been forcibly removed from their homes since the government-led
eviction initiative began in 2009.26 This comes after two decades of relatively secure land tenure
for the Favelados, since the 1988 Constitution guarantees a squatter’s right to build housing on
fallow land.27 The people’s forced displacement has exacerbated vulnerability to disaster
amongst favela communities in multiple ways. First, displacement strips Favelados of the only
assets they have been able to acquire: their homes. Second, displacement reinforces the status of
favela residents as inferior citizens in the eyes of the municipal government.
For generations Favelados have had little access to many of the goods and services which
wealthier civilians, located in the city center, take for granted. Lack of proper sewage or drainage
systems as well as inadequate access to healthcare and education are prominent indicators of the
favela residents’ marginality and vulnerability to disasters. Each year, many people die in the
mudslides which come with the heavy rains.28 Expanding deforestation at the edge of the
Rohcina favelas has worsened this risk. Meanwhile, the government still lacks the capacity and
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motivation to remediate such conditions. For decades there has been relative silence within
political discourse regarding the issues surrounding favela communities, the least of which
include racial and other types of social discrimination, merely reinforcing the favelados’
widespread exclusion from citizenship.29 Favela communities’ living conditions and socioeconomic situation are the result of life decisions made due to the constraints placed upon them
by both cultural and historic forces; their vulnerability, and the daily risks they face, are
primarily generated by how power and resources are withheld or distributed throughout society.
Such may be through traditional practices of entitlement, government-imposed restrictions to
individual access, or through kinship networks within the community.30 All of these factors, it
must be noted, are not stagnant and are subject to constant change, adaptation, or revision, like
all components of culture and civil society. As such, globalization has altered the nature of
resource allocation and traditional patterns of human interaction, and especially in the face of
political turmoil, economic downturns or hazard events, Favelado’s access to the resources and
services they need are increasingly unpredictable.
The favela dwellings of Rio, nearly all of which lack sanitation systems, have only grown
over the decades. Residents have put generations-worth of income and physical labor into the
construction and consolidation of their homes which are built upon areas of high-environmental
risk to mudslides and earthquakes. Common views surrounding the existence of favela dwellings
in Rio hinge upon the notion of a “culture of poverty”, whereby these (predominantly AfroBrazilian) individuals are seen as obstacles to their own progress by the state and upper classes

29

Brodwyn Fischer, Cities From Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Urban Latin America (London: Duke
University Press, 2014), 9-30.
30
Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability,
and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994), 64-70.

23
of society.31 The rampant presence of drug trafficking and violent gangs in the favelas has only
reinforced such social perceptions. As a result, police continue to have a large presence in the
region, seeking to dismantle rampant networks of organized crime by enforcing government-led
pacification programs. However, the abuse of police authority and an enduring history of
political isolation has reinforced a strong lack of trust between favela residents and government.
The historically-embedded social relations and power structures which exist between
Favelados and the government of Rio thus determines the vulnerability of these marginal
communities. Such is manifest through the favela population's limited access to social capital
and resources, as well as their exclusion from political activity. Simultaneously, Favelado’s
vulnerability to disaster is embedded within how the wealthier communities of Rio perceive
favela residences. Not only are favela communities highly vulnerable to disasters from triggers
such as earthquakes, floods, or landslides, but these populations also have minimal capacity to
effectively recover and adapt. In the face of a disaster, the little land inhabited by these informal
residents loses all productive value, their homes are destroyed and many lives are lost. Yet,
without proper sanitation, health care, nutrition, nor sufficient government support in the
aftermath, many more people will become ridden with disease, physically displaced, and perish.
The Favelado’s history of interaction with government has made their relationship with
municipal officials only more strained over time, for a belligerent government and lack of legal
protection to rights of citizenship have left Rio’s Favelados extremely vulnerable indeed. Their
needs are repeatedly overlooked or misaddressed by government-funded development programs,
while little is done to improve economic security for these communities. The result is a vicious
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cycle of increasing vulnerability rooted in political marginality, lack of economic opportunity,
and deeply-embedded cultural biases.
To accurately analyze the underlying causes of natural disasters and develop effective
modes of crisis prevention are more pressing issues in the twenty-first century than ever before.
The frequency and cost of natural disasters is rising globally, most especially in developing
countries where the most severe effects of climate change are felt. Media outlets, politicians, as
well as social and scientific scholars have highlighted the poignant concerns which climate
change is coming to play in shaping the world we live in. As this discussion contends, while
climate change is indeed a strong force impacting the severity of contemporary catastrophes, it is
not directly responsible for the exorbitant cost of the damage and suffering incurred, both
financially and in terms of human life. Rather, the true determinants of disasters lie within the
power systems at play in any given society when these regions come into contact with a
triggering hazard event. The media often portrays the suffering of vulnerable communities
during a disaster to be the result of natural processes and climate change: that nature has become
an existential threat to mankind and the cause of human suffering. The dominant argument here
is that disasters are to be attributed to natural causes, and can therefore be explained in terms of
exceptional environmental events, not of continuing and normal social processes.32 However,
this view overlooks some of the most critical root causes and dynamic socio-political pressures
that create disasters.
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In fact, disasters are directly attributable to different forms of interaction between distinct
populations, state governments, and the environment. These modes of interaction may be broken
down into three basic categories: the degree to which a rights culture exists in civil society and is
upheld by government, the developmental capacity of the state to address the needs and demands
of its citizens, and finally the degree to which the environment and natural resources have been
disrupted as a result of manipulation by political and economic agents. The strengths or
weaknesses of the state along any one of these three elements alters the vulnerability of civilians
to natural disasters by changing people’s capacity to cope with adverse weather conditions, as
well as by determining environmental resilience to severe hazards. In a weak, underdeveloped
state, disaster prevention and response units are either non-existent or ill equipped to address the
needs and demands of citizens. Similarly, in regions with a poor history of upholding human
rights, not only are many citizens forced to accept unsafe living conditions and insecure
livelihoods, but people’s access to the resources necessary for effective adaptation are often
withheld and coping mechanisms obstructed. Finally, under conditions where resource extraction
and excessive industrial development have degraded the integrity of the natural environment to
the point of severe instability, a hazard such as a monsoon or hurricane can create catastrophic
flooding and landslides. Under the proper conditions, such events can easily escalate into a
natural disaster.
By utilizing these three frameworks of analysis, the following discussion will expose how
the damage inflicted by natural disasters is not merely a product of severe weather, but is rather a
manifestation of the pre-existing socio-political and economic structures that have generated
unsafe conditions for the marginal and disenfranchised residents of such regions. The outbreak of
disaster thus exposes the moment when these instabilities come into contact with an
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environmental hazard. Historic processes of isolation, oppression, and exploitation, combined
with contemporary international power systems, interact in complex ways to affect different
socioeconomic classes distinctly. The result is to create vulnerability and scarcity among the
most defenseless communities. These processes affect a society’s ideological orientation and
their cultural norms, empowering some while isolating others. When the resulting dynamic
pressures and root causes come into contact with a natural hazard, a disaster is likely to follow
due to the high vulnerability of certain groups and their inability to adapt as conditions change.33
This will be illustrated in detail by analyzing the experiences of disaster in Haiti,
Ethiopia, and Nepal throughout the following chapters. By exploring the historic roots of Haitian
vulnerability, it will be shown how the three aforementioned frameworks interact across regional
and temporal spheres to generate distinct outcomes of vulnerability and unsafe conditions. By
focusing attention on the current famine in Ethiopia, this analysis will highlight the role of
international actors, economic interests and repressive regimes in generating disaster outcomes
from recurring environmental hazards such as a prolonged drought. Finally, in the case study of
Nepal, the tensions between these frameworks will be further addressed within the framework of
political economy, illustrating the pivotal role of the state and other political agents in
determining the exact manifestation of environmental disasters.
Across the world, the risks faced by communities are becoming increasingly new and
uncertain. Populations are migrating from rural to urban centers, while remittances and new
components of the international political economy continue to alter the global allocation of
resources. At the same time, contemporary geopolitical interactions are shifting the stability of
populations everywhere. The current refugee crisis, conflicts currently underway in Central
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Africa, as well as the migratory patterns of families across Latin America, provide only a few
examples of how socio-political patterns combine with economic factors to help shape the
vulnerability of both individuals and entire communities to natural disasters. In order to
effectively address these debilitating crises, the international community must begin to take
preventative, and not just reactive measures. Such will require that international institutions and
governments alike address disasters as a function of the daily risks which people face that
heighten their vulnerability. By understanding a population’s vulnerability to be a direct result of
the social and political context in which a hazard event occurs, one cannot overlook the
importance of factors such as class, ethnicity, or regional affiliations in determining the outcome
of and international responses to such events. Rules and institutions must be able to adapt over
time. By approaching contemporary disaster analysis through a holistic lense, accounting for the
inextricable effects of social, political, and economic patterns within a community, the links
between the risks people face and the reasons for their vulnerability to disasters will be exposed
as deeply embedded within the broader patterns of social interaction. Only with such an
understanding of how natural disasters arise can the international community effectively address
one of the greatest threats to human security in the twenty-first century.

Chapter Two: Assessing the Root Causes of Haiti’s Natural Disasters

As this chapter was being written, Hurricane Matthew tore across Haiti, the death toll
climbing from one hundred to well above four hundred victims in a single hour. However, its
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island neighbor, the Dominican Republic, reported only four deaths.34 Haiti is known as the
poorest nation in the Western hemisphere. Approximately 60% of the population lives in poverty
and 25% in extreme poverty.35 Throughout history, Haiti has experienced some of the most
severe natural disasters in the region while other Caribbean states have suffered very little in
comparison. Such trends are a strong indication that there are many significant factors beyond
environmental conditions which determine the manifestation of natural disasters within any
given nation state. Haiti’s experiences of disasters, as will be illustrated in the following
discussion, are highly dependent upon the outcomes of socio-political ideology, foreign
influences, and economic conditions. Haiti’s past defines various elements of its current political,
economic, and cultural identity, and these -- not environmental hazards -- are the true root causes
of Haiti’s repeated experience of natural disasters.
Natural disasters are directly attributable to the material aspects of Haiti’s condition. The
daily recreation of Haitian vulnerability to natural disasters cannot be fully understood without a
comprehensive analysis of the people’s history, local ecological interactions, as well as a detailed
understanding of Haiti’s political economy. With these considerations in mind, the following
chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of Haitian history. The purpose of this discussion is
to expose how the state’s social, economic, and political experiences have destroyed the
resilience of civil society against environmental stressors, while also eviscerating the stability of
the natural environment. When these dynamic pressures and underlying patterns of oppression
come together under the appropriate environmental triggers, crisis-level disasters are inevitable.
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At the center of Haiti’s excessive suffering lies the enduring prominence of structural
violence: institutionalized processes of exploitation and marginalization rooted in the nation’s
political and economic experiences. Structural violence in Haiti is a process of exclusion and
exploitation that is exerted systematically upon the most marginalized and impoverished groups,
being perpetrated by Haitian elites and foreign nation-states alike. Poverty, inequality, racism,
and the endurance of patriarchal exploitation are all symptoms of such endemic structural
violence. Examples of structural violence abound, whether one looks to the period of French
colonization, US occupation, the successive Duvalier regimes, or to any of Haiti’s numerous
kleptocratic military juntas. The institutionalization of corruption, violence, self-aggrandizement,
and racism has become entrenched deep within Haiti’s political culture, and have only reinforced
the dominance of degenerate social structures and the state’s overwhelming lack of political
leadership across millennia. These patterns of interaction and exclusion simultaneously uphold
the social machinery of oppression while reinforcing the de-socialization of a people from their
rights as citizens and human beings.36
For Haiti, the influences of structural violence have eviscerated any capacity for the
government to enforce the rule of law or provide social goods to its impoverished, highly
vulnerable population. In fact, it is often government officials themselves who actively destroy
the legal institutions designed to protect civil society, thereby placing government actors and
institutions at the center of the issue. The result has been a complete lack of political
accountability, rampant human rights violations, and enduring economic insecurities. When
combined with the severely destabilizing effects of global warming, as well as Haiti’s geographic
location, natural disasters are imminent. To explore the historical roots of Haiti’s natural
disasters requires that one acknowledge how the architects of this structural violence manipulate
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tactics of de-socialization: erasing historical memory and consolidating resources to maintain the
balance of power in their favor.37 Inevitably, this comes at the expense of the human dignity and
security of those most oppressed and exploited.
The root causes of structural violence in Haiti can be traced back to the era of French
occupation. Between 1681 and 1789 over 450,000 African men and women were imported into
colonial Haiti to support a plantation system sustained by a brutal slave labor regime.38
Throughout the era, Haiti grew sugar cane, coffee, indigo, cotton, tobacco and many exotic
spices which were in high demand throughout Europe and Asia. Among all the industries
promoted by the French, none was more lucrative than sugar.39 It was not uncommon for slaves
in Haiti to die before the age of twenty-five, it being cheaper for plantation owners to simply
import new slaves from Africa and work their men to death than to maintain adequate living
conditions in the slave quarters.40 The purpose of all colonial practices was thus to enrich the
French empire irrespective of the human cost.
Due to the excessive growth of the sugar industry in colonial Haiti, economic forms of
production across the island shifted from traditional subsistence farming to plantation-based
agricultural practices. The transformation in production methods enacted during this time
precipitated a decline in crop variety and regional biodiversity, both of which made rural farmers
highly vulnerable to famine should a disease or drought wipe out the season’s crops.41 These
methods of production also destroyed the resilience of the natural environment against severe
weather patterns.
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Ever since the 17th century Haiti’s cash crop economy has infinitely magnified the
nation’s environmental susceptibility to disasters. The expansion of plantation-based monocropping during the colonial era undermined the stability of the natural environment to
dangerous levels by damaging biodiversity.42 Plantation farming also led to rapid deforestation,
which intensified when coffee was introduced in 1730. The expansion of export crops into
Haiti’s forest, fallow lands, and terrain previously devoted to subsistence, caused many local
plant varieties and gatherable food products to go extinct.43 As an ever-increasing amount of the
country’s arable land was converted into cash crop plots to service European markets, many
Haitian farmers lost their livelihood diversity (a common safeguard against famine).
Simultaneously, deforestation and reduced biodiversity depleted the quality of soil, leading to
erosion and mudslides from severe storms. Combined, these trends made both the environment
and the people increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters.
However, beyond the environmental consequences of colonialism in Haiti are the
extremely important cultural impacts of French domination. Throughout the colonial era,
France’s brutal plantations system exploited workers in ways which have scarred the habitus of
Haitian politics and civil society to this day. As Paul Farmer noted,
“Colonial realities … forever [marked] Haitian understanding of social process. Modernday Haitians are the descendants of kidnapped West Africans, and their collective
identity today cannot be fathomed without an understanding of Saint-Domingue. Hailing
from scores of tribes, speaking as many mutually unintelligible languages, the Africans of
Saint-Domingue had nothing in common but their bondage and their hatred of their
oppressors.”
The disunity and cultural isolation of Haitian slaves was thereby instrumental to upholding the
machinery of oppression in the colonial era. These conditions are also pivotal to understanding
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the disenfranchisement, marginalization, and vulnerability faced by a majority of the population
today. Under such conditions, colonialism condemned Haitians to work within a political
economy of scarcity while also encouraging the persistence of dynamic racially-based
hierarchies. Slavery, and the tyrannical mechanisms of plantation-based sugar economies
introduced under the French, have fractured the organic unity of the nation, creating sharp
divisions based on race and class. Within this system of discrimination and oppression blacks
remain at the very bottom of the social hierarchy.
In 1804, Haiti became the first nation in the Americas after the United States to gain its
independence. Yet, even as a free republic, the cultural impacts of the colonial era endured. Haiti
remained divided by the economic priorities of the wealthy mulattoes against the black masses.
While the new elites insisted that the emerging peasantry produce lucrative commodity crops for
the global marketplace, Haiti’s former slaves desired nothing more than to be left alone to
produce for themselves and local markets.44 Almost immediately after independence, the elites
took control and reinstated the plantation systems through contract labor.45 Thus, the inequalities
of the colonial system were revived under a new regime of oppression.
Throughout the 1800s, the pauperization and political marginalization of African Haitians
continued en masse, exacerbating people’s vulnerability to environmental shocks inordinately.
Haitian producers who were not part of the plantation regime did not fare much better, however,
as most producers who were linked to the global marketplace did so through intermediaries.46
Such a system resulted in the spatial isolation of the peasantry, not just from the outside world,
but also from other classes within Haiti.47 This weakened the unity of the masses in the face of
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impending elite domination while also denying the peasants agency over their own means of
production. Time has done little to improve such conditions: the black majority of Haiti’s
population are still entrenched deep within this a feudal system and the masses are still denied
many of their basic rights.
Today, Haiti’s barren mountains stand as a physical reminder of the exploitation the
nation has faced over the years, and environmental resilience has only worsened. Immediately
following independence, land remained unequally distributed amongst the elites of society.
Peasants have been granted access exclusively to the marginal slopes above the fertile plains, yet
far below the zones of coffee production.48 These soils are particularly susceptible to erosion
when cleared for farming. However, with thousands of poor, displaced Haitians, such lands are
the only areas to which families have access and control.49 The forced resettlement of many
communities into the hillsides exposes not only their economically impoverished status, but also
highlights their correspondingly marginal political agency.50 These conditions have meant that
such communities lack access to many of the goods and services which would improve their
resilience against environmental hazards or provide protection from the crisis-level storms that
are now so prevalent.
Unrestrained resource extraction and economic exploitation have plagued Haiti since the
eighteenth century. Such processes have eviscerated the resilience of the environment against
natural hazards and increased livelihood volatility amongst the poorest and most vulnerable
demographics. As USAID reported in 2016,
“Widespread deforestation, particularly in the hillsides, has led to flooding, dramatic rates
of soil erosion, and subsequent declines in agricultural productivity. Haiti’s valuable
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coastal and marine resources have been degraded by sediment deposition and overfishing,
resulting in considerable loss in biodiversity”.51
For Haiti, the decay of environmental quality from aggressive farming practices, in conjunction
with a long history of colonial exploitation has led to the gradual, yet indisputable rise of socioeconomic insecurity and authoritarianism. These are both forces which heighten people’s
vulnerability to disaster in complex and mutually reinforcing ways.
Concerns regarding Haiti’s rapid environmental degradation have become increasingly
worrisome since independence in 1804. Following the Haitian revolution, the government was
forced to export timber throughout the 19th century to pay off a 150 million Franc indemnity to
its former oppressor. This debt was justified by France as compensation for the losses incurred to
plantation owners during Haiti’s war for independence, as the French elite were deprived of their
primary source of wealth (their slaves and sugar plantations) after Haiti won its independence.52
Meanwhile, Haiti attempted to maintain plantation-style production methods as a means of
producing export crops. Yet, with the land destroyed after the civil war and wage labor payments
making the endeavor less profitable, Haiti’s economy suffered substantially. This, combined with
the outrageous demands which France forced upon Haiti, eviscerated any possibility for Haiti’s
new government to develop the domestic infrastructure and welfare programs necessary to
secure its vulnerable citizens against natural disasters.
Furthermore, while French slave owners demanded payment of their reparations, the
United States and other Western powers imposed a trade embargo against Haiti in an act of
solidarity with the island nation’s former oppressor. In 1825, the United States even went so far
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as to block Haiti’s invitation to the Western Hemisphere Panama Conference.53 This effectively
placed the nation in a state of diplomatic quarantine. Under such circumstances, Haiti was not
recognized as an independent nation by the international community until France acknowledged
full payment of Haitian debt in 1893 -- almost ninety years after independence.54
However, even during Haiti’s period of official ‘isolation’, the United States maintained a
firm hold over all political and economic affairs within the state at the expense of the Haitian
government. On numerous occasions U.S. marines would storm into the Banque Nationale
d’Haiti and claim large sums of money supposedly owed to the United States.55 Various military
historians have also recalled that, “The United States Navy [was] compelled to send warships
into Haitian waters to protect the lives and property of American citizens.”56 This occurred in
1849, 1851, 1857, 1858, 1865, every year from 1866 through 1869, 1876, 1888, 1891, 1892, and
again each year between 1902 and 1915.57 The United States maintained ships in Haiti
practically uninterrupted throughout the entire period of ‘isolation’. However, the aim of this
unofficial US occupation was less to protect American lives or promote stability in Haiti, than it
was to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout the early twentieth century, the United States
became increasingly strict in controlling Caribbean commercial traffic and access to the Panama
Canal.58 Therefore, while ostracized, the new nation of Haiti was not ‘isolated’ as some would
claim. Rather, the country was a much-used pariah, manipulated by the United States and
European powers for economic or political gains.59 In a broader context, this history is indicative
of the nature of power relations in the post-colonial era, whereby global hegemons have been
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able to collectively alienate underdeveloped prior colonies, assuring the weaker states’
subservience to dominant political interests and sustained economic dependency. Since the
colonial era, international power hierarchies have generated and reinforced excessive livelihood
insecurities, transnational displacement, and greater overall vulnerability to natural disasters
amongst the world’s most desperate and marginalized societies.
As such, the cultural junctures and ideologies established by Haiti’s colonial social
hierarchies are a central force behind the state’s repeated subjection to despotic regimes and
enduring economic underdevelopment. The ideologies promoted throughout colonialism and into
the era of US occupation have fostered the state’s tendency towards authoritarian militarism in
numerous ways. Under the Haitian culture of political degeneracy, people’s rights have virtually
no legal safeguards; thousands of individuals are thus left abjectly poor and oppressed by the
elites and government alike. Deep livelihood insecurity and desperation for a sense of protected
humanity against oppression are defining characteristics of the Haitian condition. Such factors
are central to understanding Haiti’s incapacity to address or prevent natural disasters. It was also
a combination of these sentiments which fueled the nationalist rhetoric espoused by those who
supported tyrannical dictator, Francois Duvalier throughout his reign from 1957 to 1971.60
In the post-independence era, the consequences of commodity crop production in Haiti
have not been merely environmental, but also incorporate important socio-political and economic
considerations. These secondary dimensions pose direct implications for determining people’s
vulnerability to, and the likelihood of, disaster under hazardous weather conditions. Such is the
case since growing cash crops like coffee or sugar inevitably constrain the production capacity of
producers within the fluctuations of global markets, while also altering the ecological conditions
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experienced locally.61 Throughout the 1900s, the further expansion of monocrop agricultural
practices for globalized trade was deeply established within the governing networks of the state,
and large US agribusinesses played a central role in shifting agricultural production methods
throughout the nation. Even today, USAID continues to implement modernized development
projects such as Feed the Future or Climate-Resilient Farming, which come with many negative
economic and environmental consequences for the same Haitians they claim to serve.
In 1970, industrialized sweatshop production began after the United States invested
heavily in the growth of assembly line manufacturing. Quickly, factory labor replaced coffee
production as the number one source of income.62 With the subsequent modernization of industry
and an exponentially increasing population, charcoal demand in the capital, Port-Au-Prince,
increased substantially.63 This caused even greater deforestation across the country and
accelerated the rate of environmental degradation -- something which was already a problem due
to unsound commercial agricultural practices and ever-increasing competition over land.
The twentieth century did not fare much better. As globalization furthered Haiti’s
connections with international markets, industrialization expanded unrestrained. Further
deforestation exacerbated tensions between neighboring populations, aggravated soil erosion,
and prompted the global media to label Haiti as suffering from an enduring environmental crisis.
Meanwhile, foreign direct investment, mostly from the United States, continued to pour into
Haiti. Currently, the United States accounts for 85.3% of all Haitian exports.64
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Since independence, the fate of Haiti has been intimately tied to US interests. In the
1980s Haiti was a poor, over-crowded country, ruled by a U.S.-backed, right-wing regime that
was highly supportive of increasing US assembly plants, called maquilas, across the state.65 By
the end of 1980 Haiti became the world’s ninth largest assembler of goods for US
consumption.66 Revenues from international outsourcing constituted over a quarter of the
country’s annual foreign exchange receipts.67 US interference in the domestic affairs of Haiti has
created some of the most dramatic and enduring forms of structural inefficiencies within the state
apparatus, forcing Haiti to become even more susceptible to natural disasters. As Roger Burbach
and Mark Herrold described, “Largely because of its cheap labor force, extensive government
repression, and denial of even minimal labor rights, Haiti is one of the most attractive countries
for both the subcontractors and the maquilas.”68 During this period, Haitian exports to the US
(which consisted mostly of nuts and fruit) increased by a mere 3500%, indicating the rising
levels of Haitian dependence upon its imposing American neighbor.69 US interference in Haiti
thus altered the political and economic agency of local farmers to an increasingly marginal
status, forcing their subservience to the demands of Yankee imperialism. Simultaneously,
economic intervention caused irreparable damage to the environment and integrity of social
unity. Repeatedly, the US has intervened in Haiti to extract what little economic gains the nation
can provide, exploiting local Haitian farmers and the environment in the interests of large
multinational corporations. Seeking to assuage these conditions, ignorant environmental
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conservation programs and inefficient foreign aid initiatives have flooded into Haiti. Yet, this has
only worsened the people’s dependency and endemic vulnerability.
Over time, in response to dynamic political constraints or economic desperation, some
Haitians have attempted to lease and sharecrop their fields. However, since there remains
virtually no space for traditional fallowing practices in such rugged terrain, soil quality has
further deteriorated.70 Likewise, poor economic conditions combined with the human tendency
toward risk adversity have dis-incentivized capital investment for fertilizers on these leased
lands.71 While the sharecropping system is still practiced in many regions of rural Haiti,
agricultural output remains at levels only sufficient for basic subsistence plus the sale of a minor
surplus in local markets.72 To this day, free market capitalism and neoliberal policies continue to
heighten Haitians’ vulnerability. Haiti’s current economic policies tend to favor the urban over
the rural sector, appeasing US interests while directly harming the income security of rural
communities.73 For the average Haitian farmer, the possibility of getting a loan is minimal. Even
when an individual is fortunate enough to find a lender, the interest rates are so high that he must
relinquish almost all of his profits, or in some cases, face insolvency.74 Furthermore, small
landholdings combined with the high cost of borrowing effectively destroy the growth capacity
of rural farming communities, condemning rural farmers to produce foods exclusively for the
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local market and domestic consumption.75 To grow agricultural products on the scale necessary
for export is too costly for the Haitian peasant. Beyond this, soil erosion and rampant
deforestation have destroyed valuable, arable land beyond repair, worsening the level of
economic uncertainty faced by rural peasants.76 The aforementioned conditions, combined with
an ever-increasing population, bring about widespread unemployment across Haiti and present
significant, yet not entirely understood cultural, political, and environmental consequences for
the security of the nation. Endemic marginalization and pauperization of the Haitian populace
has forced a majority of people into risky and unpredictable living situations along Haiti’s barren
hillsides.
The consequences of these trends are made most explicit by the outcome of Hurricane
Jeanne in September 2004. As the storm tore through the nation, approximately 3,000 Haitians
were left dead, while in the Dominican Republic, the death toll was in the single digits.77 Various
reports have noted that a majority of the casualties in Haiti were caused by massive landslides, as
vast amounts of water fell along the eroded hills. The storm destroyed soil cover and swept
through entire communities in a violent “wave of destruction”.78 The devastation suffered by the
delicate landscape completely shattered the homes and all material assets of its residents, while
in the aftermath many people remained isolated from much needed aid and medical care due to
lack of infrastructure. The government’s complete incapacity to address the needs of society
under such dire conditions meant that many Haitians later perished from disease, malnutrition,
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and poor sanitation.79 Sadly, Hurricane Jeanne is just one instance among many which exposes
how the Haitian people’s forced migration into the barren mountains has obliged them to accept
everyday situations of greater risk and insecurity to natural disasters.
Collectively, the outcomes of such a history have ensured that the Haitian state is to
remain powerless and incapable of providing for its people. According to Transparency
International’s 2015 report, Haiti ranks 158/168 on the corruption perceptions index.80 The
nation is also one of the most poverty-stricken in the world. To this day, the government lacks
the capacity to strengthen infrastructure, mitigate violent crime, improve access to health care,
and even to provide basic public goods such as proper roadways and adequate sanitation.
According to the UN Human Development Report of 2011, “The poorest 30% of the population
has access to less than 6% of the country’s income [...] the richest 2% of Haiti’s people control
26% of national wealth.”
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Since the report was published, the situation in Haiti has only

worsened. Haitians’ vulnerability to disasters and disease epidemics is expected to increase as
global warming and rising sea levels in the Caribbean region worsen, as the urban population
proceeds to grow exponentially, and as the nation continues to suffer debilitating material and
social conditions. Together, such processes have amplified inequality and rates of natural
resource extraction in Haiti. These factors are the dynamic result of colonially-driven
environmental destruction combined with the exploitative mechanisms of a neoliberal world
order. Never have the perpetrators of this structural violence considered the consequences of
their actions for the local populations most directly affected. The masses are effectively excluded
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from the political and economic life of their society, giving rise to poignant vulnerability to
natural disaster.
Migration, both domestic and international, has also been pivotal to creating Haitians’
vulnerability to disaster. With the increased strains of rural life under the governments of the
19th and 20th centuries, many rural families left their villages behind in search of higher paying
work in Port-Au-Prince or the Dominican Republic. To this day, the vast majority of the
Dominican Republic’s migrant Haitian laborers are part of the informal economy: undocumented
and illegal residents, moving from job to job in search of employment and evading detention or
deportation by Dominican authorities.82 In these instances, not only are Haitian laborers left
without the guarantees of citizenship while in the Dominican Republic, but they are also forced
into unsafe and unregulated working conditions that magnify their vulnerability to natural
disasters in numerous ways. Under the proper environmental circumstances, a natural disaster is
the certain outcome of the political and social conditions that these migrant workers have
accepted out of pure economic desperation.
Domestic patterns of urban migration also leave many individuals at greater risk and
vulnerability to disasters. This is most notably done by increasing people’s susceptibility to
disease epidemics such as HIV/AIDs and by placing greater strains on the local administration to
accommodate such a massive influx of individuals.83 When a severe storm hits Haiti, the people
are physically vulnerable and the state under great stress, lacking roads, communication
infrastructure, and even proper urban sanitation or waste removal systems. 84 Combined, such
circumstances mean the outbreak of natural disaster is inevitable. Urbanization has also fractured
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community ties within rural locations, as younger populations leave in search of work, and as
men depart from their families to improve economic opportunities by sending remittances
home.85 Out of financial necessity, many women also resort to prostitution to supplement their
income, placing themselves and their families at greater risk to violence, displacement, and
disease epidemics.86
Irrespective of the risks, urbanization has increased significantly in the 21st century, and
the state continues to face rising pressures in order to accommodate the influx of new residents.
Massive shantytown settlements proliferate, and this urban chaos only worsens the effects of a
natural hazard, especially since a majority of Haiti’s housing remains undocumented by federal
agencies.87 Squatter settlements often lack sewage systems and proper drainage, basic
infrastructure, safety standards, and electricity, sprawling for miles in nearly all directions. Even
now, the government has yet to construct federally maintained roads or telecommunications.88
Meanwhile, deforestation and erosion continue on a massive scale in rural regions. Thus, across
the state, Haiti’s natural environment continues to deteriorate alongside the people’s resilience to
hazards.
Family ties and the unity of kinship systems have suffered from urbanization in Haiti as
well, and this limits people’s access to valuable knowledge and coping mechanisms. Kinship ties
and strong social capital are central components in determining a people’s vulnerability to, and
the likelihood of, a disaster outbreak. As the World Disasters Report explains, an important
element of early hurricane warning systems in the Caribbean are the local organizations and
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networks of awareness that come “from below”.89 Such knowledge previously provided rural
communities with important tools and networks to cope with hazards. Traditional systems of
self-help and social protection at the neighborhood level, as well as training of local activists in
rural areas, are pivotal to the survival of high-risk communities in the face of environmental
hazards. Valuable kinship networks of reciprocity, as well as a sense of belonging to a
community, have gradually eroded within many Haitian villages due to urbanization. Such
factors, however, are essential to ensuring the stability and security of marginalized
demographics not only in Haiti, but across the globe.
Therefore, the social and cultural degeneration of Haiti is in many regards a symptom of
the country’s emergence into the international sphere. With the rise of globalization and the
hegemony of neoliberal ideology, the Haitian economy has become part of a new hierarchic
chain of exploitation -- within which Haiti again lies at the bottom.90 Participation in the world’s
capitalist system has reinforced patterns of extreme inequality between the regional cores and
peripheries of economic interaction. Such trends effectively condemn Haiti to a state of unerring
danger to violent outbreak due to uncontrollable social polarization and inequality. By
eradicating traditional resource systems and dismantling prior resource allocation patterns
between man and nature, Haitian citizens have lost the valuable knowledge base which
traditionally provided communities with early warning mechanisms and ways to physically cope
with environmental hazards. Furthermore, the modern era has seen Haiti forced into a new
system of exploitation whereby the nation is defined as a ‘failed state’ of unerring dependence
upon foreign actors and aid for economic survival. When a hazard strikes, these dynamic
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pressures and instabilities are compounded to the breaking point, marking the outbreak of
disaster.
Haiti’s political system and economic structure present serious implications for the
vulnerability and coping capacity of various social groups against natural hazards. The outcomes
of policies enacted under US-sponsored dictator, Jean-Claude, ‘Baby Doc’, Duvalier are perhaps
the most apparent illustration of this point. During Duvalier's fifteen years in power, tariffs for
US goods were virtually eliminated, and domestic rice producers were swamped with imports
from American farming operations.91 This stripped small Haitian producers of their primary
source of income and sent hundreds of thousands of bankrupted farmers into the slums of Portau-Prince or abroad looking for work.92 In exchange for such amenable trade policies, the United
States protected the Duvalier regime against peasant uprisings.93 Duvalier’s policies not only
caused widespread displacement, leaving thousands homeless and politically isolated, but also
generated enduring socio-economic instability and vulnerability among the urban and rural poor
alike.
This was especially the case for women. Being the predominant demographic of the
agricultural workforce, women lost access to markets for the cash crops they had grown.94
Meanwhile, their families survived on meagre levels of food, since their production of
subsistence goods had been reduced in order to grow more profitable crops for export.95 What is
more, a woman's agricultural plot was oftentimes not even formally acknowledged by the state as
a site of economic production, since the land was documented under her husband’s name, he
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being the formal proprietor under patriarchal norms.96 As a result, women were more vulnerable
than men to the shifts in economic policies under Duvalier. US imperialism created a situation
that further entrenched patriarchal exclusion: not only did women suffer from the loss of
resources, capital, and livelihood security, but they were also overlooked by the state as a
productive element of national output. The women who became displaced under the Duvalier
regime were left with no choice but to go in search of better employment opportunities in the
cities. Often times, they became victims of Latin America’s lucrative human trafficking rings.97
In this sense, the consequences of economic openness and free market capitalism in Haiti are
twofold: the further destruction of environmental resources, combined with the displacement and
rising insecurity of millions of individuals.
The legacy of Duvalier has only aggravated the country’s perpetual political instability.
Haiti’s succeeding Western-imposed dictators have continued Duvalier’s legacy by regularly
employing violence, corruption, and coercion as a means of maintaining power over all lucrative
resources. The repeated imposition of corrupt and violent dictators (all of whom have been
backed by the US) has further entrenched domestic inequalities and socio-political tensions
across Haiti.
Therefore, one must view the current humanitarian crisis in Haiti, a central force behind
the nation’s repeated experience of disasters, as a process deeply embedded within the patterns
of violence and exploitation that plague the nation. The movement of resources and people from
the countryside into urban and global markets, and the consequences of this commercialization
for local populations, is central to understanding the deforestation and degradation occurring
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locally. This is a system of extraction which magnifies Haitians’ vulnerability to environmental
disasters exponentially. It also undermines the agency of Haitian producers over their own labor.
Haiti’s complex history highlights the role of foreign political entities and capitalist ideology in
augmenting the degeneration of traditional knowledge systems, government agency, and
environmental relations amongst local populations. Such conditions cause heightened livelihood
insecurity among the landless and marginalized masses, and subsequently, engender greater
vulnerability to disaster nationwide. As the case of Haiti indicates, a confluence of dynamic
forces: colonialism, neo-imperialism, environmental degradation (aggravated an enduring legacy
of exploitation, political corruption, and militant dictatorships) often generate social and
economic conditions of deep insecurity.
These concepts illustrate the highly political and economic dimensions of environmental
narratives in Haiti and overturn conventional ideas regarding the region's environmental crisis.
Common discourse portrays the Haitian condition as the inevitable outcome of natural forces and
of the state’s backwards, inefficient government. However, this mainstream narrative is flawed,
as it disregards the root causes of Haitians’ vulnerability. Indeed, when floods or hurricanes hit
the region, the resulting environmental destruction is quite substantial. However, this damage is
not merely due to the storm alone. Rather, it the product of over a century of insensitive political
and economic processes which have stripped the land of its biological integrity, robbed the
people of their livelihood security, and eradicated culturally-shared coping mechanisms. From
this standpoint, the root causes behind Haiti’s inordinate experiences of natural disasters become
quite clear.
With the destruction of the environment and loss of biodiversity that has occurred since
the 18th century, the basis of Haitian livelihoods has become increasingly vulnerable to shocks
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from dynamic political, social, and economic forces. In reference to the recent 2012 earthquake,
the state was labeled by NBC news as a "victim" of one of the “deadliest natural disasters” in
history.98 However, nature does not simply take advantage of humankind in such a malicious
way; other factors, of an entirely anthropogenic origin, are equally to blame for Haiti’s suffering
from one of the “deadliest natural disasters” in history.99 It is the outcome of multiple factors
compounded in a single instant: severe natural hazards as well as the dynamic pressures of
political and economic insecurities, which actually cause the disasters so often highlighted by
media publications. Only when these elements (of both natural and human origin) are combined
can a natural disaster truly take hold.
Therefore, understanding Haiti’s experience of natural disasters must be viewed from a
framework of political ecology. That is, the traditional relationships which people have with their
natural environment, in many ways defines their resilience against, and capacity to adapt under,
stressful environmental conditions. When external or state political entities impose land
restrictions and enact new policies which do not account for traditional forms of resource use (as
was the case under both French and later US occupation) the livelihood of these communities
become threatened in dramatic ways. Such trends constrain the people’s adaptive capacity
against environmental stressors and diminish their physical security in everyday life. For Haiti,
the first steps towards stripping rural farming communities of their ability to cope with adversity
and sustain themselves began with colonial occupation. Yet, these harmful processes have
endured in the modern era too, being marked by Haiti’s peripheral economic status and severe
state of dependency. Resource-importing countries like the United States and dogmatic structural
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adjustment policies only further constrict the state’s ability to realize a sense of economic
empowerment -- something which would ultimately enhance people’s resilience against natural
disasters.
Additionally, the impact of international political systems and Western interests upon
Haiti’s faltering government dictate the gendered allocation of resources, access to capital, and
people’s overall vulnerability across the region. Beyond the role of economic ideology on the
micro level, foreign demands and aid conditionalities reinforce a system of dependence in order
for Haiti to achieve economic acceptance on the global stage.100 Even the most well-intentioned
forms of foreign assistance in Haiti will often heighten the insecurity and vulnerability of at-risk
communities rather than help.
No event is a better manifestation of this phenomenon than the earthquake of January 12,
2010, which killed more than 220,000 people and nearly demolished Port-Au-Prince. Many
would agree that this disaster was predicated upon the dismal social, political, and economic
conditions rooted in Haiti’s history. However, the nation’s recovery from this catastrophe
highlights its critical state of dependence upon foreign powers, international finance regimes, and
philanthropic assistance in order to survive.101 Following the quake, Haiti received over $10
billion in aid, and UN peacekeepers were sent to the region to support the recovery process.102
However, later that same year one of the worst recorded cholera outbreaks took hold of Haiti, an
island which until that time had no history of cholera. Later analyses found that UN
peacekeepers were likely carriers of the disease and had brought cholera to Haiti from prior
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deployment to Nepal.103 To date, over 470,000 cases of cholera have been reported in Haiti, and
approximately 6,631 deaths may be attributed to this single outbreak -- all due to the negligence
of the international community.104
It has been six years since the quake took place. The immediate effects of the disaster
have long since passed, yet NGOs and various humanitarian aid agencies are still delivering free
rice to Haiti, harming the country’s economy years after the emergency has subsided. Such aid is
counterproductive to the realization of economic growth and improved civil resilience against
disasters, for it shatters the demand for locally-produced items. Therefore, excessive aid impairs
domestic market functions, and in turn endangers the livelihoods of the very same Haitian
communities that international aid groups are trying so desperately to assist. In such conditions,
the likelihood of repeated disaster outbreaks is infinitely magnified.
What is more, the popularized forms of NGO charity which saturate Haiti’s economic
structure (all of which are dominated by Western institutions) reinforce a mentality of
dependency upon handouts, rather than encourage rapid recovery and economic empowerment
within the communities affected by natural disasters. In Haiti, foreign aid has become an industry
in itself, and this industry has eviscerated the demand for domestically produced goods and
services. With the compounded effects of globalization and neoliberal hegemony continuing to
attack the stability of this small state, it is likely that the government will remain incapable of
realizing the long-term self-sufficiency needed to effectively prevent, address, and recover from
disasters. The prolonged reliance of Haiti, like many developing nations, upon foreign aid
disbursements has thus prevented the government from achieving the level of economic
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development necessary to adequately support and protect its citizens from disaster. Aid has
replaced the foreign direct investment and trade revenues which would sustain a developing
economy, instead inhibiting growth by exacerbating the state’s reliance upon aid and foreign
loans. As previously noted, this ultimately harms the resilience of local populations against
disasters by limiting people’s access to goods and resources as well as by constricting the
diversity of income opportunities available.
With a firm understanding of Haiti’s socio-political history sufficiently established, it is
also useful to compare experiences of disasters in Haiti to those of neighboring nation-states.
Such a comparison further illustrates the highly political, cultural, and economic underpinnings
of natural disasters. In the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s neighbor on the island of Hispaniola,
demographic statistics expose the truly dire and highly vulnerable status of Haitian citizens.
According to the World Factbook, both nations have nearly identical populations, yet Haiti has
half the territory of the Dominican Republic. When analyzing basic indicators for general health
and sanitation levels, Haiti also falls far behind that of its neighbor. In 2012, deaths related to
HIV/AIDS in Haiti totaled 7,900 people, while in the Dominican Republic approximately 1,900
deaths were recorded.105 A comparison of these two nations in the context of a biological hazard
like HIV/AIDS provides a strong indicator of how state institutions and the socio-economic
conditions of the government generate specific levels of civil vulnerability. With a high degree
of migration between the two bordering nations, the spread of disease is not only fast, but also a
serious concern for both governments. However, the divergence between each respective
government’s ability to address the issue is quite staggering. Prior to the earthquake in January
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2010, 46% of Haitians did not have access to healthcare.106 Simultaneously, the Dominican
Republic was working to obtain universal access to healthcare for its citizens. Since this time the
Dominican Republic has become known as having one of the best healthcare systems in the
Caribbean.107 These facts illustrate an important dissimilarity between Haiti and the Dominican
Republic regarding each government's institutional capacity to address the needs of their citizens.
It also poses direct implications for people’s overall vulnerability to disasters as well as for the
nation’s capacity to recover from such crises.
Likewise, by comparing the relative ability of Cuba versus Haiti to recover from
hurricanes in recent years, the political and economic factors which generate distinct
demographic vulnerabilities to natural disasters are more apparently exposed. Both nations are
equally at risk to hurricanes, being island nations of close geographic proximity in the Caribbean.
For both states the recurrence of extreme weather from climate change has only increased in the
twenty-first century. This poses new challenges to the existing governments, both in terms of
preemptive measures against disasters and in the recovery process. However, the compounded
effects of climate change, as well as each nation’s distinct political history, alter many of the
factors which determine how affected communities will be able to recover and adapt when
hazards strike. To better understand this notion, it is useful once more to refer to the Human
Development Index referred to in Chapter One. On the HDI scale, Cuba currently scores .769
while Haiti scores .483, ranking 67th and 163rd respectively.108 The stark differences between
Cuba and Haiti’s levels of development according to the HDI (especially regarding each
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government’s ability to provide adequate education, infrastructure, and social services to their
citizens) highlights the poignant contrast in civilian vulnerability to disaster resulting from each
country’s political institutions and state-led social welfare provisions -- or lack thereof.
Specifically in the case of Cuba and Haiti, several factors have been found to strongly
influence each state’s capacity to recover from disaster. In a study conducted by Pichler and
Striessnig, higher levels of general education and training-enhanced social networks in Cuba,
factors which created a social culture of support and reciprocity, were of great importance in
augmenting local forms of resilience to disasters and reducing vulnerability.109 Such is the case
since, as noted in the study, “Education predisposes popular understanding and action, making it
a vital link in the early warning chain that makes the difference between life and death in the face
of some of the planet’s most ferocious storms”.110 Since the beginning of Cuba’s Socialist
Revolution in 1959, the clear commitment of the Cuban government to developing a legal
framework for disaster management, as well as implementing universal education and health
care systems, has meant that the public is comparatively better prepared to adapt to hazards and
overcome risk than the powerless citizens of Haiti.
In 2005, Hurricane Georges hit both Haiti and Cuba, and the effects of the storm upon
each nation individually are indeed quite different. Irrespective of the fact that the storm was
weakened by the time it reached Haiti, the impact was overwhelming. Many people lost their
homes and livelihoods due to heavy mudslides along the deforested hillsides and mountains,
leaving approximately 167,322 individuals homeless and without any access to clean drinking
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water.111 In total 209 Haitians perished as a result of the 2005 hurricane.112 Contrastingly, in
Cuba, a well-executed evacuation plan and state-directed warning system limited the death toll to
only six individuals, while superior medical institutions insured a speedy recovery.113 Thus it
becomes apparent that, relative to other nations, the Haitian government significantly lacks the
institutional capacity required to address the needs of its citizens and protect against natural
disasters, especially in terms of education, infrastructure, and healthcare provisions.
The historical overview presented in this chapter has exposed the apparent role of
political forces in generating the risks and vulnerabilities of certain populations to disaster. By
analyzing the outcomes of Haiti’s exploitative institutions over time, it has also become evident
that Haiti’s environmental conditions are in many ways the outcome of distinct political,
economic, and cultural practices. The nation has suffered from repeated forms of structural
violence and dependency: colonialism, imperialism, and later foreign aid efforts have each
played a significant role in generating a culture of poverty and lack of security surrounding basic
human rights. A government endowed with the financial and political resources necessary to
provide its citizens with proper goods and services, especially early-warning mechanisms and
emergency response units, significantly diminishes its citizen’s vulnerability to natural disasters.
Such is done by enhancing people’s overall capacity to adapt and respond appropriately in
adverse conditions. However, in Haiti this has not been the case. Instead, the nation has
experienced a long history of colonial occupation and economic exploitation that has negatively
impacted the nature of power relations within the state. Combined with the destabilizing effects
of globalization, this history has led to greater inequality, poverty, and marginality amongst the
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majority of Haitian citizens. The state’s enduring incapacity to uphold human rights, as well as
its perpetually handicapped economy, have only exacerbated people’s insecurities while
simultaneously destroying environmental resilience to severe weather. With the aforementioned
considerations in mind, it becomes apparent that in Haiti, the outbreak of disaster is intimately
linked to the legacies of colonialism and the exploitative mechanisms of dependency relations
embedded within the current international system.

Chapter 3: Addressing the Root Causes of Famine in Ethiopia

Upon examining Ethiopia’s recurring experiences of famine, it is tempting to
relate the cause of these natural disasters to the most visible characteristics. These include: the
country’s dependence upon traditional agriculture and pastoral farming, recurring droughts, rapid
population growth, and agricultural market dysfunctions. However, to accept such a rationale
would be to overlook the most important component in understanding how natural disasters,
especially famines, develop into recurring crises. Ethiopia’s enduring history of human rights
abuses and inter-ethnic violence, accentuated by an unaccountable, self-interested government,
are among the most important, yet often overlooked factors which both create and prolong
famine in the state.
People’s vulnerability to natural disasters is indeed heightened when they are forced to
cope with both poor environmental conditions and the defective governance of various regimes.
Such circumstances have been instrumental to generating the unsafe conditions faced by a
majority of the Ethiopia’s farming communities. This is the case whether government influence
over people’s vulnerability manifests itself through policies of resource allocation, by limiting
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public access to various goods and services, through civil-military relations, or within the nature
of contemporary trade policies and economic goals. In Ethiopia, history exposes that when the
underlying political structures of society are impounded by rapid population growth,
environmental degradation, and a citizenry deeply dependent upon agriculturally-based
livelihoods, famines can easily become recurring crises. Thus, drought in Ethiopia is merely the
catalyst of famine, whereby more complex and enduring power relations are what truly
determine how people will either cope with drought or potentially how these hazards could
escalate to disastrous famine conditions. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, the
following discussion will analyze various elements of contemporary Ethiopian famines. Such
will expose the central role which government actions and decisions, as well as cultural
perceptions can play, not only in prolonging a famine, but also in directly generating the natural
disaster itself.
To begin, however, one must take into account the complex manner whereby power
relations alter the distribution of assets and resources within society. This concept is instrumental
to understanding the causal chain of events preceding famine, for it determines whether people
will be forced into the unsafe and hazardous living arrangements that exacerbate vulnerability to
natural disasters.114 The underlying socio-political processes inherent to a community directly
affect the distribution of resources and assets across a region and are concerns which could mean
life or death in times of drought.115 In Ethiopia, land and freedom movement are by far the two
most valuable assets possessed by any individual. From the Oromo and Afar pastoral
communities of the highlands, to the Amhara and Somali agriculturalists, land has always been
pivotal to the survival of Ethiopia’s residents. Land provides the material basis for livelihood
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security, while the people’s freedom of movement ensures access to markets for the sale of
surplus goods, as well as to reserve grazing lands in times of drought.116
In this case study, vulnerability to famine will be addressed through two prominent
frameworks: the food availability decline (FAD) and food entitlements decline models (FED).117
The former argues that disruption to food production below a certain level, being triggered by a
natural hazard, is what causes famine. The latter focuses on how shifts in people’s ability to
acquire food through a variety of means (whether this be personal production, trade, state
provisioning, or otherwise) creates a decline in people’s purchasing power and precipitates the
outbreak of famine.118 The FED approach provides an important means of understanding how
relations of power have changed throughout Ethiopia’s various regimes, determining the
distribution of assets and income across the rural regions most vulnerable to drought. Central to
the arguments put forth in the following analysis is an understanding that any adequate
explanation of famine requires that both root causes and underlying socio-political pressures be
linked together in a causal chain of explanation. Doing so defines the various access and
entitlement mechanisms which have given rise to Ethiopia’s numerous famines. One prominent
example of why such a detailed distinction is necessary may be found in the famine of 19731977. Many scholars have attributed this incident to a severe drought. However, such an
assertion begs the question as to why, then there have been droughts without famine and famines
without drought, something which will be addressed further in later discussion.119
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Prior analyses have also exposed how livelihood insecurity figures centrally within the
root causes of natural disasters like famine. Yet, livelihood insecurities are themselves
determined by complex forces: seasonal fluctuations in weather patterns as well as important
variations to political and economic conditions over extended periods of time. Each of these
forces alters a population’s entitlements and access to vital resources in distinct ways. Social and
political processes are thus pivotal to conceptualizing the dynamic pressures that precipitate
famines in Ethiopia. While it is true that the recurrence of flood and drought can be anticipated
with relative certainty, it is much more difficult to anticipate how changes to political or social
relations may shock people’s ability to acquire different essential resources in times of scarcity.
In Ethiopia, demographic trends can change quite rapidly, while other factors such as moral
values and cultural knowledge change relatively little over time. Oftentimes, the impact of such
fluctuations in one sphere of life, intensified by corresponding changes to environmental,
economic, or political circumstances, can engender instability and unsafe conditions for those
concerned. As a result, cyclical patterns of drought and flood in Ethiopia do not necessarily
indicate the outbreak of famine. Rather, we must understand the significance of a flood or
drought as it exists along a continuum of temporal events. Indeed, natural hazards are often the
trigger of famine. However, the essential components of creating a disaster from a hazard are the
social processes and economic conditions which mature over time and define the political
context in which hazards erupt. In Ethiopia, there is perhaps no single factor which determines
the orientation of socio-political relations to a greater degree than ethnicity.
Ethnic ties have continuously played a pivotal role in shaping the ideological
preconceptions of Ethiopia’s political economy, and in turn, upon the outbreak of famine. Across
the country there are over eighty different ethnic groups, and while some represent over a million
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individuals, others represent fewer than ten thousand.120 The result is a system of highly
fragmented political representation. Sometimes these divisions even become so entrenched in
ethnic concerns that it is difficult to distinguish between identity and ideology.121 The dominant
ethnic minority of Tigray, who make up approximately 6% of the population, currently maintain
autocratic control over the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
government. Meanwhile, the two largest ethnic denominations, the Oromo and Amhara,
representing 34% and 27% respectively, continue to be persecuted by the ruling elites.122
Increasingly, the Tigrayan-led government has used ethnicity as a basis for political
organization; the Ethiopian state is ethnically divided into regional federations. Initially, the
purpose of this federal system was to help the EPRDF government maintain control over the
country’s myriad ethnic factions.123 However, these divisions, compounded by recent
government policies that unequivocally marginalize the political demands of other ethnicities in
Ethiopia, have exacerbated linguistic and cultural differences while also highlighting the
confluence of competing historical narratives in Ethiopia. This makes for a volatile political
environment indeed. In recent decades, ethnic mobilization against the tyranny of the Tigrayan
government has increased, and the EPRDF has responded with swift, and increasingly violent,
tactics of repression against such protest movements.124
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In these instances, the ability for persecuted or marginalized communities to access
resources, mobilize community support systems, and even to implement traditional coping
mechanisms in times of environmental stress are substantially reduced. Since the most recent
outbreak of protests in 2015, millions of the poorest, most vulnerable people in Ethiopia have
been persecuted by police forces, systematically displaced, and once again face grave risk of
starvation. In Ethiopia, as is the case more generally, the economic interests of the ruling
minority are repeatedly promoted by the state at the expense of those most vulnerable to disaster.
In such instances, state economic policies generate greater wealth amongst those in power and
their bases of support, while forcing the pauperization of marginalized ethnic groups. In cases of
drought in Ethiopia, there is often a strong correlation between the heightened exclusion of these
communities from political and economic life and their susceptibility to famine.
To further understand the intricacies of this correlation, a more detailed analysis of the
links between people’s natural environment, cultural or political trends, and the outbreak of
disaster is necessary. By deconstructing prior notions of what constitutes natural from
anthropogenic events, desegregating people’s agency over reality, it becomes evident that the
conditions whereby ‘exceptional’ natural events trigger full-blown disasters are less clear than
once thought.125 Famines are a manifestation of the distresses induced by drought, combined
with the gradual pauperization of vulnerable communities, rather than the outbreak of a sudden,
natural occurrence. For example, analyses conducted by Goyder and Goyder on the Ethiopian
famine of 1972-1973 (during which time Ethiopia was ruled by an autocratic monarch) found
that the sustained and excessive taxation of rural sectors by the Ethiopian government repeatedly
pushed these marginal peasant producers into famine conditions when such forms of taxation
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were compounded by natural hazards or other environmental strains.126 Eventually, the suffering
endured by the peasant masses during the famine of 1973-1977 led to the demise of Emperor
Haile Selassie and the rise of a socialist military takeover.
During the war and famine of 1983-1985, the Marxist government of Ethiopia instituted a
widespread resettlement program. The implementation of these mass peasant organizations, or
“Kebele Farmers Associations”, sought to redistribute land among the masses and enhance
agricultural output.127 However, governance under the Marxist regime was entirely inadequate
and corrupt. Instead of investing in social goods, the government implemented nation-state
building projects to bolster their power base. Kebele Associations thus became satellites of the
central government and dropped all pretenses of enhancing agricultural output. The principal
tasks of Kebele Associations quickly became apparent: the surveillance of communities for
government purposes, the dissemination of propaganda, and the enforcement of government
policies.128 As a result, the potential economic value of the program accorded little importance,
and actually retarded agricultural production, while its greatest achievement was keeping an
illegitimate regime in power.129
This socialist regime marked a period of stagnation and lack of progress in the
agricultural sector. Government policies throughout the era caused a noticeable drop in food
entitlements as well as the real purchasing capacity of rural households, infinitely magnifying
people’s risk to famine. The reasons behind these severe agricultural failures can be attributed
most directly to poor policy implementation and the dominance of a highly defective, self126
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interested government. Among some of the most destructive policies enacted by the state were:
the outlawing of hired labor on farmland, the fixing of official crop prices at artificially low
levels, the high cost of fertilizers, and the forced requisition of a portion of agricultural output by
government agencies.130 Combined, the productivity of Ethiopia’s agricultural sector plummeted
in the early 1980s. Simultaneously, the state’s usurpation of a large portion of annual yields
generated widespread resentment and mistrust towards government amongst farming
communities. Ultimately, these policies destroyed livelihood security and placed farmers at
much greater risk to famine.
The socialist regime in Ethiopia also faced significant resource constraints, as the Cold
War was in full swing. This stalled the efficacy of state-led famine mitigation projects. The
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was established immediately following the
famines of the 1970s in an effort to provide safeguards and early warning mechanisms against
famine. However, demographic factors made it difficult for the government to collect accurate
data regarding which regions were at-risk and undernourished. Furthermore, it also became
quickly apparent that the RRC failed to garner much attention from neither the international
community nor from the Ethiopian government -- even when it sounded famine warnings to
mobilize assistance.131 As the United Nations reported, the RRC Commission had been, “In fact
very vocal in its warnings regarding the increasing incidence of food shortages [...] However,
evidence is available that the regime, in its effort to legitimize its hold on power, had suppressed
the magnitude of the 1984 famine”.132
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Ethiopia’s socialist government also devised a famine prevention resettlement scheme in
the early 1980s with the ambitious objective of relocating approximately 2.5 million rural
civilians from the drought-stricken regions of northern Ethiopia into the more fertile areas of the
south. However, all this was done within the poor organizational and logistical capacity of the
unpopular military regime. In almost every case, the northern populations were coerced and
tricked into relocation by government forces, being tempted by the promise of food aid at certain
locations.133 Yet, upon arrival they were loaded into trucks and sent to state-regulated settlements
against their will.134 Never was there any sort of government assistance or compensation for their
lost property and psychological trauma, nor was there help to establish new livelihoods.135
Furthermore, the project inadvertently moved nearly a million families into the most malaria
infested regions of the country.136 As Human Rights Watch noted, the program was a “disaster
[...] and resulted in the deaths of a minimum of 50,000 people”.137 The project was part of a
larger state-led process which regularized the use of counter-insurgency strategies by
government forces. Such actions directly restricted the population’s access to critical resources
(such as food and economic markets) and effectively destroyed the livelihood security of
hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian citizens. Some of the most devastating of these counterinsurgency tactics included: the forced relocation and control of the rural population, as well as
the closure and military regulation of marketplaces, key roads, and transport links.138 These
strategies not only prolonged the brutal government-led violence of the civil war, but also forced
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millions into a state of severe vulnerability. Ultimately, such actions led to the famine of 19821985 which is today responsible for the death of over one million people.
Beyond resettlement, the government also impeded the transport of grains and cereals
throughout the 1980s. Whether domestically produced or foreign disaster relief donations, the
government blocked the delivery of foodstuffs to the most desperately ravaged regions of
Ethiopia.139 These deprived areas were not only subject to severe drought, but they were also the
stronghold of EPRDF resistance, and thus a primary target of military raids.140 To cut off their
supplies, the government required that all foreign food aid donations were channeled through
official state agencies.141 It is also important to note that widespread drought occurred in the
regions worst hit by famine months after a humanitarian emergency was already declared in
Ethiopia.142 By placing restrictions as well as various economic and social burdens upon
Ethiopia’s displaced rural individuals, the state played an instrumental role in creating the
infamous famine of 1984. It is estimated that this famine killed a minimum 400,000 people,
while military casualties and deaths associated with forced relocations bring that number up to
over a million.143
As has been indicated, one of the greatest factors contributing to a population’s
susceptibility to famine is the volatility of income and livelihood security. Government policies
and military actions conducted throughout the 1980s highlight the fragility of Ethiopia’s rural
economy. Even the slightest deviation from normal income for rural sector households in
Ethiopia could mean destitution. The highly political roots of Ethiopia’s 1983 famine are further
139
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reinforced by economic data which exposes the perceived government priorities at the time -priorities which, it should be noted, do not acknowledge the needs of the people. Throughout the
1970s and 1980s GNP per capita was declining across Ethiopia, averaging $190 USD in 1985
(compared to $18,279 in the United States).144 The decline of GNP per capita which occurred
across the twentieth century is indicative of the worsening poverty throughout the region.
However, this also highlights another serious concern: self-sufficiency in food production has
only decreased over the years.
These are factors whose causes are not attributable to the severity of drought conditions.
Rather, they are symptoms of the severe economic mismanagement and deficiencies in
governance which took place under both the autocratic monarchy of the 1970s and the later
socialist military regime of the 1980s. According to data collected by T.M. Vestal, only about
19% of Ethiopia’s potentially cultivable land had been brought under production by 1985.145 By
the end of the 1983 famine, Ethiopia was importing 70% more foodstuffs than had been brought
in during the 1970s. Compare these facts to the level of Ethiopian food production immediately
following World War II, whereby the nation -- using only traditional agricultural methods -- had
enough surplus production to export food aid to the Middle East.146 With such considerations in
mind one begins to appreciate that only by delineating a causal chain of historic events,
developing a detailed understanding of the political economy within which Ethiopia’s famines
emerge, can the underlying pressures that destroy livelihood security and inhibit people’s
adaptive capacity be revealed as crucial mechanisms in driving the outbreak of famine.
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As part of its cultural identity, Ethiopia is a state founded upon the principles of conquest.
War between neighboring regions has always played a central role in characterizing traditional
socio-political relations. The unremitting brutality of Ethiopia’s armed forces is a dominant
element in its history of invasion, rebellion, and counter-insurgency campaigns.147 The
significance of this in relation to natural disasters lies within the fact that, as a general rule, all
politically motivated events have a direct influence upon the socio-economic position which
citizens are forced to accept in the political fabric of the nation, as we saw in the case of Haiti. A
person’s ethnicity, class orientation, gender, and racial identity each figure prominently in
determining their respective entitlement to the resources essential for survival during times of
environmental strain.148 As referenced in the opening pages of this chapter, the causal connection
between decreased aggregate food supply (from failed crops and drought) and famine outbreak,
while correct, avoids the larger array of forces behind famines. To merely attribute famine to a
decline in food availability is to make the erroneous assumption that food availability is shared
equally among the population and also that the people of Ethiopia have no sources of income
beyond food production.149 Famines are a manifestation of changes to people’s access and
entitlements to the foodstuffs of society, these being outcomes determined by a complex puzzle
of cultural, political, and economic trends. Dynamic pressures such as warfare are prominent
examples of the highly political forces behind famines, for such events have the capacity to
destroy local economic systems and infrastructure across vast regions while also affecting
production and trade capacity. As was addressed chapter one, warfare displaces immense
numbers of people. It destroys people’s sources of income, homes, sense of security, and causes
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overall levels of sanitation to decline. Combined, these conditions cause a greater number of
people to become highly vulnerable to severe famine or to biological epidemics such as
HIV/AIDs, malaria, and Ebola. Warfare itself thus creates a self-reinforcing cycle of heightened
insecurity.
Throughout Africa, the violence associated warfare destabilizes affected communities
physically and economically. Armed conflict, whether perpetrated by government forces or
paramilitary organizations, forces widespread migration and the displacement of innumerable
civilians. This has been the case for Ethiopia’s famines between 1972-1973 and 1983-1984,
throughout Sudan and South Sudan in recent decades, as well as in the conflict minerals regions
of central Africa and Congo -- to name a few. A number of scholars have even gone so far as to
highlight the strong correlation between high state military expenditures, exploitation of peasants
(by limiting access to markets and outright coercion), and the rise of famine in the Horn of
Africa.150 These characteristics are typical of Ethiopia’s ethnically-based wars of conquest as
well. Even so, it is important to note that the consequences of violent conflict among vulnerable
populations are not contained by political borders. Violence in one area often tends to generate
regional instability and enduring humanitarian crises by increasing the number of stateless
migrants in dire need of economic support and livelihood stability. Such facts highlight why
research has increasingly indicated that the greatest cause of death from conflict in low income
countries is not direct violence, but is actually the secondary impacts of war: disease, hunger, the

150

E. Shindo, “Hunger and Weapons: The Entropy of Militarism,” Review of African Political Economy, 33 (1985):
6-22.

68
destruction of markets and infrastructure, and the massive disruption to livelihoods caused by
people fleeing from the conflict.151
These are among the most common ‘unsafe conditions’ and ‘dynamic pressures’ which
increase people’s vulnerability to famine during a drought. Under such circumstances vast
numbers of people lack assistance from the kind of stable, transparent, and responsive
government which would provide the resources necessary to help them survive and cope with
natural disasters. As Piers Blaikie et. al. elaborates within his analysis on the politics of famine,
in agriculturally-based economies such as Ethiopia, war tends to reduce both the quantity of land
that is planted in a season, as well as the amount of labor that is available to conduct such tasks,
thus reducing the supply of food without even taking into account the shocks of potential
environmental hazards.152 Warfare of all types can also play a more direct role in the creation of
famine conditions, as testimony from survivors of the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia highlights in
vivid detail,
“The army took 500 cows and oxen from my village, they burned people’s houses and
took honey, butter and anything made of leather. They even took old clothes. They didn’t
bother to carry the grain; they just burned it. The militia, they’re farmers from the area,
they take our tools so that they can use them. They all take salt and coffee [...] They eat
as much as they can and then sell what’s left. In 1982 the army came through our village
and forced me to pay E$400. I had to borrow the money from a neighbor. Because of the
money that I had to pay the army, and the grain that they burned, I had to sell all my
animals in 1984. Now I have nothing”.153
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Such testimony reinforces that it is not necessarily a decline in food production or availability
which precedes the outbreak of famine. Rather, it is the possibility of a decline in entitlements
and access to foodstuffs as a result of violence, coercion, or otherwise. These acts may be
conducted by armed rebel forces, or in some cases, by the state itself, as occurred in Ethiopia
from 1972 to 1973 and again a decade later.
Yet, warfare is not the only political pressure which generates widespread vulnerability to
famine. Subtler socio-political trends also highlight the important role of ideological
preconceptions in influencing policy decisions, in turn determining the manifestation of disaster.
By looking at the government’s expenditures from 1979 to 1984, it becomes clear that the most
significant sectors of the economy relating to food production only received 4.8% of the national
budget, while 58.6% was allocated for “general services” (this included defense, public order and
security).154 In a more contemporary context, the case of the marginalized Oromo ethnic majority
in Ethiopia under the current government’s Anti-Terror Proclamation and Addis Ababa Master
Expansion Plan, is a paralleling expression of how ethnic biases can lead to the targeted and
state-directed marginalization of a people, forcing them into famine conditions. It is to this issue
which the discussion will now turn.
The Oromo are Ethiopia's biggest ethnic group, accounting for about a third of the state’s
95 million people. However, the major political party of the Oromo people, the Oromo Federalist
Congress (OFC), does not hold even a single seat in parliament. Ethnic Oromo are traditionally
pastoral farming communities, yet government plans for economic development threaten this
population’s way of life. The current Tigrayan minority regime has been able to maintain a
monopoly over political expression in Ethiopia through corrupt and coercive means. This has
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resulted in state perpetration of grave human rights violations against many of the nation’s ethnic
groups, including the Oromo. The Tigrayan government is known for their long history of
violent repression against independent media, civil society organizations, and political
opposition. Repeatedly, the administration has enacted draconian laws that reinforce the gradual
breakdown of civil society. By manipulating the jurisdiction of federal counter-terrorism
legislation, the current regime has stifled the voices of Oromo protesters who attempt to
peacefully express their concerns about the federal government’s approach to development.155
More specifically, protesters have indicated great discontent with the Addis Ababa Integrated
Development Master Plan (AAIDMP) which will expand the capital city into the communally
held territory of Oromo farmers, displacing tens of thousands of people and destroying their
livelihoods.156 The aims of the AAIDMP are further reinforced by recent economic development
policies supported by the IMF and World Bank. Again, the result will be to eradicate the means
of subsistence for thousands of Ethiopian families.
The second dominant catalyst of protest in Ethiopia results from enduring ethnic
discontent and a deeper crisis of representation that has marginalized the Oromo and Amhara
populations both politically and economically. Since 2014, the government has been operating
under a newly-formulated, long-term economic development strategy of “Agriculture
Development Led Industrialization” (ADLI). This policy is geared towards the transformation of
the nation’s previously ‘backward economic structure’ of communal landholdings in the
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agricultural sector, towards privately owned, industrialized production.157 This new development
plan is two-pronged, incorporating export led economic growth with the domestic expansion of
agriculture and industry into corporate holdings. The Ethiopian government has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of widespread privatization as part of their goal: a real GDP growth
rate of 11% and meeting the Millennium Development goals.158 Combined with its efforts to
expand agricultural production, the government has encouraged the construction of industrial
factories and the sale of lands (including water rights) to Chinese hydropower companies to
expand the economy.159 Such large-scale alterations to land tenure practices, combined with the
build-up of previously unregulated territory throughout Ethiopia, have had a major impact upon
the ability for low-income and agriculturally-based populations to access the resources essential
to their survival.
The current government in Ethiopia has a persistent history of violent suppression of
independent media, civil society organizations, and political opposition. The government has
enacted many restrictive laws that enfeeble civil society and, in conjunction with the misuse of
the counter-terrorism law, stifle peaceful dissent. Since the AAIDMP was first published in
2010, Oromos have faced a brutal crackdown by government forces following what were
initially peaceful protests. Numerous human rights organizations have documented the arbitrary
arrests, torture, and injuries suffered by thousands of individuals residing in Oromia since the
regime first came to power in the 1990s. Between 2011 and 2014 alone, at least 5,000 Oromos
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were arrested based on their actual or suspected opposition to the government.160 The individuals
targeted by the government include thousands of peaceful protesters and hundreds of political
opposition members. Some estimates place the number of persons killed by government forces at
the beginning of 2016 at over 400.161 However, the exact numbers remain unclear, as the bodies
of thousands of disappeared individuals have not been found, and many remains are yet to be
identified.162 Exact data regarding the nature and regularity of these government attacks is also
vague, as independent media and human rights organizations are banned from entry into the
country. The only information available to the global audience is the testimony of survivors and
those lucky enough to escape.
Famine in Ethiopia was announced by the United Nations on July 20, 2011. However,
drought was declared about six months after the government-led attacks began, with the most
severely drought-affected regions being in the eastern parts of Ethiopia. Further analysis of the
graphs provided below demonstrate a clear difference between territories under severe drought
conditions (located further east of Oromia) and other areas of severe famine conditions which
are, surprisingly, not suffering from a dramatic drought.
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What these figures indicate is a high discrepancy between areas of severe drought
(mostly in the south-east of Ethiopia) and regions of high food insecurity and famine across the
nation. Therefore, while there is famine in the regions suffering from severe drought, the lack of
such dire environmental conditions in and around, especially to the north of, Addis Ababa
(where there also exists severe famine) would imply that other factors beyond environmental
stressors are indeed central to creating the famine currently underway in the Horn of Africa.
Since the Oromo crackdown began, Ethiopian politics has undergone an important
transformation to how relations of power are understood and assets are distributed. In regards to
agriculture, the fundamentals of Ethiopia’s development strategy include,
“The shift to produce high value crops, with a special focus on high-potential areas,
facilitating the commercialization of agriculture, supporting the development of largescale commercial agriculture where it is feasible. The commercialization of smallholder
farming will continue to be the major source of agricultural growth. To complement this
concerted support will be an increase to private investment in large commercial
farms.”163
In effect, these policies redefine Ethiopia’s political economy. The current development strategy
has already created consequential shifts in how societal pressures interact to affect the outbreak
of disaster. The combined effects of Ethiopia’s fragile ecosystem, deforestation, chronic
uncertainties over land tenure, lack of rural credit, and the monopolistic power of certain ethnic
groups over markets, have serious implications for understanding the roots of the current famine
in Ethiopia. Since 2015 alone, thousands of individuals have been detained while hundreds of
homes and businesses have been destroyed by government security forces in an effort to stifle
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voices of dissent.164 These acts effectively destroy fragile livelihoods beyond repair, while also
weakening the resilience of the environment against hazards such as drought or flood. The threat
of state-sanctioned violence against those who speak out in protest of government policies,
combined with the usurpation of traditionally pastoral farmlands by government and
multinational corporations, forces Ethiopian pastoralists into an even more severe state of
vulnerability.
In recent years Addis Ababa has experienced significant growth. Yet, as noted, Ethiopia’s
development policies have destabilized the livelihood security of many families due to forced
and widespread land privatization, especially amongst the farming communities that account for
approximately 75% of the population.165 Rarely have authorities provided compensation for the
confiscation and sale of people’s territory; when restitutions are provided they do not come close
to covering the loss of livelihoods incurred.166 Farmers rarely if ever receive alternate land, and
the courts (which are effectively under the control of the government) provide no recourse for
these losses.167 As a

result, ADLI and the AAIDMP have increased the vulnerability of

marginalized communities to disaster by severely restricting people’s entitlements to even the
most basic goods and services, by routinely violating people’s human rights, and by
simultaneously destroying the income security of millions.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s rapid economic expansion has allowed the state to become a
prominent ‘success story’ for transformational development in the eyes of the West. However, in
Ethiopia, like China, economic development has come at the expense of human rights and the
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strength of civil society. Ethiopia is seen as a reliable police officer in the region: hosting a US
military base and sending troops to fight the Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab in neighboring
Somalia. However, the Western support currently enjoyed by the regime has meant that the
international community will continue to turn a blind eye to the perilous displacement of
thousands of the individuals affected by national development projects. The stateless and
marginal status of the farming villages impacted by state policies forces them into severe
insecurity. Access to land continues to be restricted and entitlement to traditional resources
forcibly revoked.
The country's current development strategy is supported by an economic reform program
developed in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF, focusing on a series of structural
adjustment programs which have been implemented since 1992. In order to support economic
growth in Ethiopia and other African states, dominant Western nations and multilateral
institutions (including USAID and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) have drifted away
from the food security strategies devised in the 2009 G8 L’Aquila Summit. These strategic food
security plans called for $20 billion to support state-owned agricultural production in Africa, yet
they have been pushed aside in favor of widespread privatization campaigns.168 This shift
represents an unprecedented push to favor private sector and market-driven food systems through
aid programs, such as that embodied by Ethiopia’s current Growth and Transformation Plan. The
2012 G8 initiative, called the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, launched in
partnership with various agribusinesses, seeks to increase private investment in African
agriculture. Private sector companies have collectively committed more than $3 billion to
increase investments, while donor partners have pledged to support Africa’s potential for rapid
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and sustained agricultural growth.169 These projects have already begun in Ethiopia, figuring
centrally in the outline of ADLI.
However, the imposition of this agenda comes with new aid conditionality. In order to
receive aid through the New Alliance, African partner countries have to commit to structural and
economic reforms that facilitate business in agriculture, part of which includes the privatization
of industries for economic output.170 It is this internationally mandated land privatization,
however, which is generating a great deal of displacement, diminished livelihood opportunities,
and increased economic insecurity throughout Ethiopia. As noted previously, for the pastoral
communities of Ethiopia, access to wide swaths of arable land and freedom of movement are
vital concerns when resources become scarce during a drought. The usurpation of grazing lands
by various interest groups has caused the displacement, suffering, and even death of many
Ethiopians from famines directly attributable to a decline in popular land entitlements.
The new economic policies promoted by multilateral institutions and the Ethiopian
government also call for the use of hybrid and GMO seeds, pesticides, and synthetic fertilizers,
as well as a shift towards monocrop and cash-crop production systems.171 The implementation of
these agricultural practices, however, will not only destroy traditional, collectivized forms of
pastoral farming (which preserve biodiversity and soil integrity through crop rotation), but will
also further diminish the capacity for farming communities to adapt to adverse environmental
hazards and control their economic opportunities. Many people will be forced into unsafe living
spaces or relegated economic conditions, while biodiversity will continue to deteriorate and
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agricultural production become increasingly industrialized. Prior experiences have exposed the
unsustainability of a food system based on intensive use of petrol products and chemical inputs,
many of which are heightened by climate change and the global energy crisis. The conventional
agricultural model that prevails in the global food chain accounts for at least 14% of total annual
greenhouse gas emissions, mostly due to the use of nitrogen fertilizers.172 The African region is
already highly vulnerable to environmental hazards. The political situation within many nations
creates great risk and instability for the local people. Meanwhile, the land faces a tenuous
existence under mono-cropping, GMO production, and synthetic fertilizer use. The rise of
industrialized and privatized agricultural production in Ethiopia will only exacerbate the
vulnerability of farming communities throughout the region -- with likely consequences for the
populations of neighboring states as well.
Already, Ethiopia’s development policies have stripped many farmers of the little
political and economic power they once held. Instead, the state is concentrating corporate control
over seeds, land, and water to promote rapid economic expansion. Many communities are being
forced to accept poorly paid and insecure wage work, while important historical and cultural
connections to the land are being severed by commodification and commercialization. The result
is the promotion of self-interest by a few rich nations, and greater livelihood insecurity amongst
thousands of individuals, such as the Oromo of Ethiopia. As policy analyst, Anuradha Mittal
noted,
“In order to foster private investments, governments are being forced to open their
agricultural sector to seed, pesticide and fertilizer corporations, release land for
commercial agriculture, and reduce taxes and tariffs for agribusinesses. In short, facilitate
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the destruction of family farming and natural resources for the sake of corporate
profit.”173
The resulting pollution of water resources from excessive chemical pesticides and fertilizers will
also exacerbate soil degradation. Ecological imbalances will continue to worsen due to rising
deforestation for agribusiness projects. Ultimately, the privatization and consolidation of
agricultural production across Ethiopia (and Africa generally) can be anticipated to increase
corruption and conflicts of interest. What the current African development paradigm represents
is a future of frequent social upheaval by the landless and marginalized pastoral communities,
the rising impoverishment of rural households, and a reduction in the number of alternatives for
income security amongst these at-risk populations.
Combine these factors with the cyclically recurring droughts experienced throughout the
West African region, and the famine currently underway in Ethiopia becomes a disaster of
deeply political, social, and economic roots which was merely triggered by the el Niño drought.
Droughts have been a normal element of Ethiopia’s climate for centuries, and the recurrence of
dry spells periodically do not typically lead to such disastrous outcomes for the populations who
depend upon the rains for food security. Current political unrest in the Ethiopia, compounded by
the government’s unwillingness to allow outside humanitarian organizations inside the country
for fear that they may document current human rights violations (as well as institutional
insecurities resulting from the violence) make getting emergency aid to these farming
communities very difficult. Currently over 10.2 million people are affected by the famine in
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Ethiopia.174 In February 2016 the Secretary General of Ethiopia stressed that a crisis of this scale,
“Was too much for any Government [...] The international community must stand with people of
Ethiopia. Immediate support for Ethiopia will save lives and avoid preventable suffering.
Immediate support will also safeguard the impressive development gains that Ethiopia has made
over the past years and decades”.175 Still, however, international aid agencies are not permitted
within the state by government forces, and aid must be channeled through the distribution
mechanisms directed by the regime. Government restrictions upon the flow of people,
information, and goods across Ethiopia’s borders have made it increasingly difficult to collect
definitive data regarding the severity of the current famine as well as to catalogue the number
victims from state-led violence. Only time will tell as to how the international community may
choose to respond to this disaster, but with the Ethiopian Government’s recent ascent to the UN
Security Council and seat at the UN Human Rights Commission, it seems unlikely that
conditions will change in the foreseeable future.
Ultimately what we must take away from this historical exploration is the central role
which government and civil society alike play in precipitating the outbreak of famine in the
modern era. While true that environmental processes are often the catalyst behind natural
disasters, it is important to understand that anthropogenic pressures and the socio-political trends
of these regions are what ultimately give rise to famine conditions. Such is done by altering
peoples’ access and entitlements to the resources needed to survive in the face of drought. The
chain of events preceding famine shows that the state plays a direct role in either the prevention
of or creation of famine conditions within their borders. The outcome of a natural hazard is
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entirely dependent upon the ideological preconceptions held by the government, for these
ideologies direct the policy decisions and priorities governments may choose to emphasize. In
the case of Ethiopia, this is made evident by the regime’s support of economic development
through neoliberal mechanisms, rather than promoting social justice by supporting the needs of
civilians and upholding the rule of law. The political and economic decisions made as a result of
such a policy orientation is the predominant cause of the famine in Ethiopia we see today.

Chapter 4: The Political Economy of Disaster Relief
– A Case Study of Earthquakes in Nepal
April 25, 2015 was a calm, sunny day in the Himalayas along the Nepal-Tibet border.
Gore Ghale had just recently arrived in Malaysia to begin work as a construction assistant. He
was constantly thinking of his beloved wife and five children back home in Nepal, whom he had
left for a better paying job overseas. At this same moment, his wife, Niru, was with two of their
children in Trizuli Bazaar, a rudimentary town approximately four-hours driving (plus a threehour trek) from their family village of Thangdor. She had just gone for the day to look for work,
leaving their eldest three children home to attend to the goats and crops, as planting season was
just a few weeks away. However, Trizuli Bazaar was not the place to be on April 25, 2015. The
site was only 40 miles from the epicenter of an impending 7.8 magnitude earthquake.
It was midday, children were outside playing along the terraced hillsides of Thangdor,
and women were collecting water to carry on their backs up the steep cliff sides towards their
hut-like dwellings. “My children and I were inside when the walls began to sway, and the world
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came crashing down around us,” one woman recalled.176 Screaming in Trizuli Bazaar, Niru and
her children ran outside where tall trees quivered like blades of grass. “It was utter chaos,” she
sobbed. “People were screaming and buildings crumpled like matchboxes, burying many alive.”
Sleeping outside in the freezing cold that night, Niru had little idea that it would be an entire
month before she could return to Thangdor. Niru had to wait nearly thirty days to find out that
the bodies of her three eldest children were never found in the rubble that remained of their
home. Meanwhile, Gore was on a two-year contract in Malaysia, unable to return to Thangdor
until January 2017, and this left Niru with her two surviving children alone in a heap of
destruction and isolation. “We huddled together outside our destroyed homes,” Niru recalled
once she made it back to Thangdor. “My two children were badly injured, but I had no means or
money to go to the hospital in Kathmandu. We did what we could for food. So many animals
crushed to death -- including mine. We waited for months before any government help came. My
neighbor has donated her cowshed for us to live in until we build a new home,” She said,
pointing to a straw shelter in the distance, covered with tarp as a shield against the cold
Himalayan wind. The story of Niru and her family is unfortunately one which is not unique
amongst those who live in rural Nepal, yet it is a story which presents great insight into the role
of political incentives, from both domestic and international actors, in affecting the outcome of
natural hazards upon demographic regions of high risk and vulnerability. By tracing the political
history of Nepal over the past century, and later analyzing earthquake mitigation efforts through
a political economy framework, this case study will expose the highly political dimensions of
creating natural disasters in Nepal.
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Two years have passed since the 7.8 magnitude earthquake shook the earth, yet still the
villagers of Thangdor and the surrounding rural communities have not seen any government
assistance or significant international aid. Simultaneously, environmental conditions continue to
exacerbate people’s suffering: the river which this community used to depend upon for all means
of subsistence has been submerged somewhere under the rocky mountainside after the
earthquake shifted the terrain indefinitely. Each day, women and children carry approximately
100 kilograms of water on their backs over the cliffs towards Thangdor, transporting this basic
necessity from the next closest aquifer nearly a thirteen-hour trek away. No road connects these
two locations so as to expedite the process. While local leaders have issued reports of emergency
need to the Regional Administration Office (beginning as early as July 2015), the villagers are
still awaiting any form of acknowledgement by the local government. In Nepal, where
approximately 80% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture for livelihood security, the
loss of water resources has caused immense suffering and exacerbated the effects of the recent
disaster amongst those already most vulnerable.177 What is of even greater concern, however, is
the fact that the government has yet to address the complete lack of basic human necessities in
these regions, prolonging the period of disaster recovery and crisis indefinitely. Even two years
after the quake, people still lack access to sufficient and clean water, sanitation, health care,
adequate nutrition, and proper shelter.
For centuries, Nepal has been widely accepted as one of the most at-risk locations on
earth for earthquakes, yet this common fact has done nothing to alter the country’s level of
disaster preparedness. The reasons behind Nepal’s excessive risk and vulnerability to natural
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disasters are dynamic and complex, originating in the nation’s political history, economic status,
and cultural orientation. In order to better understand this phenomenon, it is useful to review the
pressure and release model devised by Blaikie et al. (see Figure 1 below)

FIGURE 1

Source: Piers M. Blaikie, Ben Wisner, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's
Vulnerability, and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994).

Looking at this model, it is apparent that political and economic systems are essential to
understanding how the evolution of policies, widespread access to information, and the
allocation of public goods can engender the outcome of hazards upon a demographic of high
vulnerability. Bodies with the capacity to alter these dynamic pressures, such as government
officials, NGOs, and foreign aid donors, all act within a highly political space, and in many ways
disasters are an outcome of these political networks. In the case of Nepal, the government is still
woefully in-equipped to address the impacts of such hazards, largely due to the nation’s shaky
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political history over the past century and current economic situation. However, by
understanding the roots of the current conditions in Nepal, the reasons behind such poor
preparation and response on the part of government becomes quite clear, and the outcomes of
hazards such as the 2015 earthquake become almost predictable.
Modern day Nepal came into being in the second half of the 18th Century when the Shah
monarchy unified fifty small states through military force, thus creating a highly fragmented
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-lingual nation-state landlocked between
India and China. This new state was organized along the rules of traditional Hindu law, with a
small number of men from the high Hindu castes dominating all public spheres at the exclusion
of women and untouchable castes.178 Such trends of exclusion are still prevalent today; the
dominant order is confined to male Brahmans and Kshatriyas (of the rural Hill Hindu groups)
and the urban Newars.179 Prolonged forms of exclusion, even under the newly ‘democratic’
government of Nepal give reason to much of the growing political unrest in the country. Central
to the organization of the Nepalese state has been the dominance of Hindu law and a caste-based
hierarchical system that prioritizes high-caste male elites. Within this system of caste
organization also exist multiple ethnic identities and religious orientations, with approximately
10% of the population identifying as Buddhist and 5% as Muslim.180 The distinguishing features
of Nepalese caste and ethnic identity are complex and often overlapping. Therefore, it is very
difficult to accurately delineate such kinship systems in this brief discussion. However, what
must be understood is that all rights, duties, and forms of punishment in Nepal are traditionally
178
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determined by an individual’s specific caste and ethnic orientation -- thus further complicating
our understanding of how prior Nepalese political structures have helped to effectuate the biases
and ideologies inherent to the current system.181
From 1846 until 1951, the Hindu Rana oligarchy dominated the Kingdom of Nepal,
bringing important changes to the central state structure while also perpetuating the noninclusive social system of caste and gender discrimination. All actions under the Rana
administration were directed by three basic practices: chakari (sycophancy), chaplusy (flattery),
and chukli (intelligence work conducted in exchange for political favors).182 Each of these
traditions reinforced the dominance of a corrupt, autocratic, and unaccountable system of
governance. Throughout the era, Nepal was also under the influence British colonial powers
from India, and thus maintained a very secluded position on the international stage. Economic
isolation would continue up until the abolition of the Rana oligarchy, marked by the passage of
the Interim Government of Nepal Act in 1951. At this time, various underrepresented groups
began to form a distinct political consciousness, each striving for personal power and privileges
within government – a stark contrast from the Rana period whereby minimum attention was
given to improving the lives of the people or broadening political freedoms.183
The 1950s marked an opening of political space promoted by efforts to frame a new
Nepalese constitution that would establish a republican, representative government based on the
British model. The development of young political groups in the late 20th century also fostered
the emergence of civil society, something which has since grown as a force of political influence,
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albeit a hesitant one. However, even with greater socio-economic liberties, many of the new
political leaders of the 1950s and 60s were of the same high Hindu castes from the Rana period
(known as Tagadhari), and political leadership remained exclusive to men of this caste.184 The
politics of these groups also highlights an important and enduring mentality characteristic of
Nepalese political leaders: that one’s own people await and demand certain personal advantages
and privileges from ‘their’ leaders in government.185 This mentality has proven to be a prominent
force behind government policy formulation even in the modern era, as rural areas which lack
representation in Parliament receive few if any public services or political attention.
Nepal has seen significant political upheaval over the last century, and this has
contributed enormously to the current failure of government to mitigate the effects of recent
earthquakes and other natural hazards. With the anti-Rana Revolution of 1951, autocratic
monarchy was effectively abolished in Nepal thanks to the efforts of student protestors, military
groups, and the support of many elite Nepalese Hindus residing in India.186 Following the
Revolution, a period of quasi-constitutional rule dominated under the 1959 Constitution of the
Kingdom of Nepal. At this time the monarch, assisted by the leaders of fledgling political parties,
governed the country. However, in 1960 King Mahendra attempted a coup and promulgated a
new constitution, endowing himself with the powers of executive, legislative, and judicial
authority combined.187 In the months that followed, the elected Prime Minister, members of
Parliament and hundreds of democratic activists were arrested -- a trend which would continue
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over the next thirty years of rule under King Mahendra and later his son, Birendra.188 In 1979
student demonstrations and opposition groups grew increasingly vocal in their dissatisfaction
with government, at times even violent. This prompted King Birendra to call for a national
referendum on May 24, thereby deciding whether Nepal should transition to a multiparty system
so as to quell the unrest and protect the monarchy.189 The efforts made to resolve disputes over
government were tumultuous, however, as the leaders of the numerous political parties were
neither able nor willing to cooperate with one another.190 Civil unrest and political upheaval
continued.
Things shifted in 1990 when Nepal made the formal transition towards a parliamentary
democracy. Often referred to as a ‘people’s movement’, this democratic transition marks the first
time in Nepali history that the two primary democratic forces, the Nepalese Congress and allied
communist groups known as the United Left Front, were able to join together towards a common
goal.191 While successful in forcing King Birendra to renounce his absolutist claim to power
(becoming instead a constitutional monarch) there was limited success in actually implementing
the necessary changes to institutionalize a democratic system. As before, the various parties
involved in the democratic transition were unable to reach an agreement as to how constitutional
changes should be made and to what extent democratic principles should be applied.192 The
resulting Constitution thus retained many ambiguities that perpetuated the exclusion of lower
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caste groups, women, and marginalized ethnic identities from participation in political life -such as denying women the right to pass their citizenship to their children or explicitly protecting
‘traditional’ Nepalese practices that necessitate caste discrimination.193 This administration was
also highly centralized; efficiency was often constrained by time and inadequate resources,
making it difficult for the executive to respond to any of the myriad issues faced by the young
and impoverished government.194 The result was a state of general neglect for many of the
nation’s most pressing concerns, thereby preventing the development of the inclusive state and
Constitution which so many social groups across the country desired. Furthermore, it turns out
that the party elites of this new democratic order were the same high Hindu castes whose
ideologies had dominated prior regimes, leaving little room for greater inclusion of marginalized
ethnic and religious groups in the process of creating a Constitution. People who had been
instrumental to the politics of suppression under the Rana regime once more came to rule under
the ‘democratic’ government of this new Nepalese system.195
Therefore, the 1990 Constitution which arose from this transition was equally
exclusionary. Political opposition was given little space to voice opinions and no ability to
influence policy decisions, leaving informal methods, such as strikes and protests (which often
became violent), as the only means of articulating opposition party demands.196 After 1990,
Nepal remained a Hindu state and its foundations embedded in the culture and values of the
ruling elite. Many hierarchical institutions, especially powerful informal networks of inter-caste
behavior, remained unchanged, even with the formal declarations of equality made by the 1990
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Constitution.197 As before, the needs and views of rural peasants were repeatedly pushed to the
margins of political discussions. This left the impoverished masses (nearly all of whom were of
the ‘untouchable’ Dalits caste, ethnic Janajatis, or Muslims) economically isolated and
effectively disenfranchised. The ultimate result was to exacerbate the vulnerability of these rural,
underrepresented sectors of society in ways which are still obvious to this day. In a society
characterized by abject poverty and socio-religious inequalities, the Nepalese people were
desperate for the kind of political representation which would introduce new opportunities for
changing their fate.198 It was this general sentiment which gave the late 20th Century Maoist
insurgency such strong support, especially from the rural sectors.199
In February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal took steps to replace the parliamentary
monarchy with a people's democratic republic. The events that followed quickly spiraled into
what has become known as the Nepalese Civil War. The Maoists constantly attacked the stability
of the Nepalese Congress that came from the 1990 Constitution.200 On June 1, 2001, the royal
line of Nepal began to unravel: Prince Dipendra assassinated nine members of the royal family,
including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, before shooting himself.201 Meanwhile, the civil
war raged on, and in October 2002 the government decided it was impossible to hold new
elections. When the term of office for local bodies elected in 1998 expired, the government was
temporarily deposed by executive order.202 This left King Gyanendra in complete control until a
week later when he reappointed another government. On February 1, 2005, Gyanendra again

197

The World Bank, Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal (Kathmandu: The World Bank
Group, 2006), 7.
198
Karl-Heinz Kramer, Bhattarai Keshav, Conway Dennis, and Hari Bansha Dulal, “Political Evolution of Modern
Nepal,” in Nepal in the 21st Century, ed. Kramer, Karl-Heinz, Bhattarai Keshav et. al. (Hauppauge: US Nova
Science Publishers, 2010), 50.
199
Ibid.
200
Ibid., 52-56.
201
Ibid., 57.
202
Ibid., 58.

91
dismissed the entire government and assumed full executive powers, declaring a state of
emergency in an attempt to destroy the people’s revolution.203 Taking desperate measures,
Gyanendera put politicians under house arrest, cut phone and internet lines across the country,
and severely curtailed freedom of the press.204 In November of that year, leaders of various
political parties in Parliament responded by signing a 12-point agreement and collectively led the
mass protest that forced the king to step down.205 Beginning January 17, 2007, Nepal was
governed by a unicameral legislature under an interim constitution drafted by the Nepalese
parliament of 1998 and the Maoist groups. Since 2008, however, the government of Nepal has
again changed eight times.206
Over the years, these frequent upheavals of government have badly hampered the
country’s development and economic growth. Since 1990 the Nepalese constitution has been
revised and rewritten numerous times and even now, with the most recent constitution’s
promulgation, there is no sign of political stability in Nepal. The game of incessant government
toppling and subsequent formation still dominates the national political arena. Many castes and
ethnic groups, as well as women, continue to face severe political repression and lack of
constitutional rights. As a World Bank report published in 2006 found, caste and gender together
account for a third of national variation in empowerment and inclusion levels; the
aforementioned lower castes are not only subject to severe political exclusion, but also show
significantly higher rates of poverty, infant mortality, illiteracy, and dramatically lower life
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expectancies.207 Democracy is still a long way off in Nepal, for with the latest constitution that
came into effect on September 20, 2015, protests have once more broken out into violence in
demand of ethnic equality before the law. Such rampant instability has made earthquake relief
aid unreliable in many crucial areas of Nepal, especially along the Indian border. Furthermore,
with corruption levels at an all-time high (Nepal scores a 29/100 on Transparency International’s
CPI), much of the aid coming in merely lines the pockets of officials who view their time in
government as a tenuous arrangement.208
The impact of the 2015 earthquake itself is not what has created a natural disaster in
Nepal. Rather, this natural shock was merely the catalyst behind a chain of politically-based
events, precipitating disaster only through the combined effects of natural and anthropogenic
forces. With this in mind, it is useful to once more review the definition of natural disasters.
These are crises which happen suddenly, being defined as hazards which have reached one or
more acute stages of damage to the populations affected. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, a disaster is defined as a “Natural event, such as a flood, earthquake, or hurricane
that causes great damage or loss of life”.209 The term ‘natural disaster’ thus refers to the net
impact of a natural hazard upon a population where there is substantial suffering. Most important
in this definition of natural disasters, however, is the understanding that disasters are a
phenomenon whereby something can be done to mitigate their effects, either before or after they
occur. It is the damage incurred by a hazard which defines the disaster.210 Therefore, in line with
the framework of analysis developed thus far, the study of natural disasters in Nepal must be
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analyzed in a manner which views these crises as the intersection of two opposing forces: the
social, political, and economic trends which generate vulnerability on the one hand, and the
physical exposure to hazards on the other.
Natural disasters occur in a highly political space, and while the exact moment that a
hazard strikes is not explicitly a political event, the environment in which it strikes is absolutely
political. Policy decisions, especially those regarding public goods and service provisions, have
the greatest potential to mitigate and even prevent the escalation of hazards into disasters.211
Public goods and policies can assuage the effects of poverty, poor health, and low levels of
education. They can also improve quality of services, enhance access to communication
networks, and alter other factors which shape a people’s vulnerability to disasters. The incentives
faced by political actors to favor certain regions over others directly effects the adaptive capacity
and vulnerability of certain demographic regions in the face of hazards. The cost-benefit analyses
inherent to resource distribution decisions can even be so strong as to determine whether a
disaster may arise at all.212 In Nepal, as with all other nations, the political decisions and
incentives made in regard to disaster mitigation and recovery are part of a larger function of
resource allocation based on notions of utility.
Governments derive utility from social welfare, political power, and financial capital,
determining the level of investment towards each respective policy option depending upon the
potential gains associated with these choices. Investment in public goods can effectively reduce
mortality from all types of hazards, as such investments improve people’s ability to adapt and
cope in the face of adverse environmental situations. For example, when allocated properly,
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public expenditures on health and education can overcome market failures that exacerbate
poverty and also those which diminish government credibility.213 Especially in wealthy
democracies where political decision makers are typically held accountable to the public for reelection, there is a stronger incentive to provide public goods proven to diminish incidences of
disaster, and oftentimes correspondingly lower disaster mortality rates.214 One possible reason for
this is the strong tendency amongst citizens to vote against politicians from the incumbent ruling
party following a disaster, irrespective of relief spending (although relief spending does have the
potential to offset the entire political cost of presiding over a disaster in its own right).215 As a
result, there is a strong incentive amongst truly democratic governments to reduce the incidence
of disasters through preventative policies and public expenditures so as to preserve their political
reputation.216 However, regardless of regime type, cross-country analyses from Asia, Europe, and
the Americas all find that relief spending provides the greatest utility for governments, as it is
most visible to the public and therefore the government can take greater credit.217 A report by
Kahn et. al. even found data supporting the claim that democracies suffer fewer deaths from
natural disasters than non-democracies. Since 1975, 244 earthquakes (five or greater on the
Richter scale) resulting in at least one death have occurred, and of these the average death in
countries with competitive elections is 629 while in non-democracies the death toll is
approximately 3,737.218
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In regards to income, current data also highlights an interesting trend. In 1999 a 7.6
magnitude earthquake killed more than 17,000 in Turkey, while a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in
densely populated Taiwan killed merely 2,300 in the same year. In Taiwan, per capita income
was three times greater than in Turkey, and deaths in Turkey were seven times higher. Placing
Nepal within this comparison further reinforces the trend: per capita income is approximately six
times greater in Taiwan than Nepal, and in Taiwan a similar magnitude earthquake resulted in
five times fewer casualties.219 This indicates an important question regarding the correlation
between natural disaster outbreaks and national wealth: why would the impact of hazards in
richer countries differ from those of poorer countries? Earthquakes are not more likely to strike
in poor than in rich countries. Data actually points to the contrary.220 From 1960 to 2005, 759
destructive earthquakes hit the richer half of the world’s countries while only 502 struck the
poorer.221 Poverty can provide only a partial explanation as to why certain countries and
demographics experience disaster while others who experience a similar hazard do not. It is not
merely poverty which acts as an indicator of disaster mortality, although this is one strong
marker.222 Rather, there are also numerous institutional and political factors at play in the
generation of natural disasters.
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Differing political incentives to mitigate disaster risk interact with intrinsic differences
between nations. Such differences may include (but are not limited to): economic stability, the
strength of civil society, imperfect citizen information, corruption, the institutionalization of
government performance and democracy, ethnic polarization, as well as international pressures.
These differences each alter the incentives politicians face when choosing where and how to
enact either preventative or reactive policy measures with respect to natural hazards. Where
government accountability to the people is relatively high and democratic institutions are strong,
there will be a higher utility derived from investments in social welfare projects aimed at
mitigating the effects of a hazard event.223 However, where the rule of law and democratic
institutions are weak, and therefore governments less accountable to the people, greater utility
would be derived from consolidating political power and financial resources for self-enrichment.
Looking at the political history of Nepal, the latter is clearly the scenario faced by the current
government.
In Nepal, the relative strength of political institutions and the presence of competitive
elections are as important in understanding the potential impact of hazards as poverty levels.
Both competitive elections and strong institutions are important proxies used to gauge political
market imperfections, which in turn provide a great deal of information regarding peoples’
ability to command from government the public goods and services that will enhance social
welfare to mitigate disaster risk.224 Imperfections such as lack of citizen information and
awareness, poor political credibility, as well as low levels of intra-government cooperation all
hinder the efficient allocation of public expenditures towards services. As Keefer and Khemani
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argue, market imperfections disrupt citizens’ ability to hold government officials accountable,
even when democratic institutions exist, as is the case in Nepal. Each form of market
imperfection acts as a strong indicator of how the strength of government may escalate the
effects of hazards into disasters.
Employing a variety of governance indicators, the posited inverse correlation between
governance and natural disasters continues to hold. According to data collected by the World
Bank, government policy stances alter both private and public disaster preparedness levels, such
that countries with weak governments (like Nepal) experience higher disaster mortality rates (see
Figure 2). In Nepal, weak governance also undermines private incentives to implement disaster
risk reduction measures (such as constructing earthquake-reinforced buildings or purchasing
disaster insurance), for property rights and contractual obligations are more ambiguous under
such a weak rule of law. Therefore, private entities are not inclined to invest in these goods.225
Even the poverty-disaster link is influenced by political incentives to some degree, seeing as
governments with few incentives to mitigate disaster mortality also tend to have low incentive to
work towards poverty alleviation; doing so would endanger the ruling regime’s monopoly over
power and lucrative resources.
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FIGURE 2

Source: Philip Keefer, “Disastrous Consequences: The Political Economy of Disaster Risk Reduction” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank
Group, 2009), 7.

Yet beyond this, ethnic fragmentation in political systems is the greatest obstacle to
improving Nepal’s resilience against disasters. Studies conducted by Weiner and Field regarding
electoral politics in Southeast Asia found that identity characteristics along ethnic, linguistic, and
religious lines overwhelmingly dominate political behavior.226 Important differences in health
and education outcomes between regions existing within the same nation state are evident in
countries across the Asian continent: Nepal, Pakistan, India and Thailand to name a few.227
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While data regarding government expenditures on public goods from an ethnic-regional
breakdown is difficult to compile for Nepal, it is useful to look towards neighboring India to
reinforce the potency of ethnic identity politics in creating a people’s vulnerability. 228 There are
numerous similarities between the two nations, especially regarding difficulties of caste
marginalization and political exclusion, making them comparable case studies for the purposes
of this discussion.
The Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala have nearly identical per capita incomes
and poverty rates. However, divergences in health and education outcomes are staggering. In
Kerala, human development indicators are comparable to those of some of the richest nations in
the world, while in Uttar Pradesh, conditions reflect those of the poorest.229 Research conducted
by Dreze and Sen is able to shed some light on this puzzle: their analysis found that these stark
differences in outcomes are attributable to equally disparate per capita public expenditures by
government.230 Spending in Kerala was more than double that in Uttar Pradesh between 1960 and
1995. Both states are in the same sovereign nation, adhering to the same formal political and
legal institutions. Yet, the most significant underlying difference between these regions is the
dynamics of political competition. In Kerala, citizens’ voter access to information, literacy rates,
and the credibility of political promises are greater, while ethnic polarization is relatively low.231
However, Uttar Pradesh is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The region has a literacy rate of
approximately 18%, limited access to media, and active institutions of social discrimination – all
of which effectively prevent the stigmatized ‘untouchable’ castes from accessing public services
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or participating in the political process.232 Kerala’s political parties have been able to compete on
credible platforms for delivering broad social services (diminishing the importance of patronclient relationships). Contrastingly, elections in Uttar Pradesh are dominated by clientelist
platforms, and therefore competitive elections have not developed.233 In Nepal, like in Uttar
Pradesh, genuinely competitive elections are blocked by the contradicting demands being made
by various independent political groups, each seeking to represent a marginalized ethnic or caste
identity.234 Literacy rates and access to media in rural Nepal (regions inhabited by a majority of
the Dalit, Janajati, and Muslim populations) reflect conditions very similar to those found in
Uttar Pradesh, and both regions suffer from similarly dismal health and education outcomes. A
lack of consensus and open dialogue between marginalized groups in both Uttar Pradesh and
Nepal only further perpetuate the strength of clientelistic platforms to reinforce political
exclusion.
Many of the socio-political characteristics inherent to Nepal, like Uttar Pradesh, shed
light on the important correlation between inequality, social exclusion, political inefficiency and
the rise of rural peoples’ vulnerability to disasters. Both Nepal and Uttar Pradesh are populated
by highly illiterate voters (suggesting poor voter information regarding the link between social
welfare and political decision-making) and are characterized by severe ethnic/caste
fragmentation. Instances of visible and often coercive social discrimination by government and
the community are rampant in Uttar Pradesh. Recent reports collected by the World Bank find
very similar patterns of caste and ethnic discrimination across Nepal, acting most directly against
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women, Dalit, Janajati and Muslim groups.235 Such active institutions of social discrimination
effectively prevent ‘backward’ castes from accessing public services or participating in political
processes.236 Clearly, a single, formalized democratic system can sustain very different types of
electoral competition and produce starkly different social welfare outcomes. The sheer endurance
of democracy cannot guarantee that political market imperfections will disappear. The resulting
policy outcomes have direct implications for the vulnerability of the most marginalized
demographics in regards to hazard recovery. With this in mind it is clear that in order for the
Nepalese government to successfully address disaster risk, the state must dramatically improve
political inclusion and the provision of public goods. However, such measures require that the
general public are able to force accountability through greater political participation, and at the
moment the rule of law remains inadequate. At the same time, many of the most disaster-prone
regions consist of excluded mountain castes with many more pressing, immediate concerns of
daily subsistence.
It is currently estimated that 25% of Nepal’s population lives in extreme poverty, and this
shows little sign of improving in the near future.237 The country’s GDP growth rate has dropped
from 6% in 2014 down to .6% by the end of 2016, and of this GDP, approximately 32% is in the
form of remittances.238 Nepal is one of the most impoverished countries in the world. A majority
of Nepalese citizens lack basic health services, quality education, shelter, and nutrition on a daily
basis -- not just in the face of extreme crisis. Perpetuating this situation are numerous economic
and political problems: poor GDP measures, an ever-increasing trade deficit, and a high external
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debt stock under a political system of utter chaos. All of this is compounded by the recent
political unrest. Meanwhile, inequality in terms of class, gender, and geography only further
aggravate the challenges faced by the modern Nepalese state. Approximately 120 ethnic groups
populate the small landlocked nation, each with a unique religious affiliation, cultural heritage,
language, and political identity.239
Geopolitical interests have also severely handicapped the government’s ability to
establish substantive democratic institutions -- something which would mitigate disaster
vulnerability for the most at-risk demographics. India and China each have their own political
incentives for seeking dominance over Nepal. The prominent role which both states have played
in the earthquake recovery process is best understood as a continuation of increasing competition
in the region’s geopolitics. While India looks to keep a Hindu Nepal aligned with their interests
as a buffer between China, the Chinese government hopes to expand its influence in Nepal as a
way of constraining the border with Tibet. In the immediate aftermath of the quake, India
pledged $1 billion USD and China just over $500 million USD.240 Especially in the case of India,
aid donations are being re-routed from the government towards NGOs which are quite likely
aligned with Indian foreign policy interests.241 Many of these organizations are led by individuals
with major government positions, yet because a great deal of this incoming aid is not directed
towards the government itself, a staggering portion of aid money is pocketed.242
Since the earthquake struck in 2015, a total of $4.4 billion has been pledged by various
international agencies and foreign governments. Foreign aid has come pouring into Nepal to fund
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reconstruction efforts, yet only half of the total amount was pledged as grants -- the other half is
completely loan money. Seeing as substantive democratic practices as well as a corruption-free
government bureaucracy are not in place, it is likely that the loans pledged by the international
community may not ever reach the earthquake affected communities. In fact, this money may
only exacerbate the underlying issues precipitating disaster in the first place. Approximately $2.2
billion is now in the hands of a weak, corrupt and un-coordinated Nepalese government. This
increases the incidence of appropriation of funds, while also increasing the national debt. With
very few substantial sources of income, the current recovery process in Nepal is dominated by
the racket effect; not only has the government chosen to under-invest in disaster prevention
(knowing that the international community will come to assist), but has also deliberately avoided
implementing disaster prevention measures in the most vulnerable areas so as to attract aid
money as a way of supplementing national income.243
Such trends can only force the country into a state of greater debt and economic
vulnerability. In Nepal, the government uses past aid donations as a signal for the amount that
they can expect during the current earthquake recovery period, thus substituting post-disaster
relief from the international community for pre-disaster risk reduction measures.
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provides very few incentives for the state to invest in disaster risk-reduction measures, for not
only are the benefits of such investments hard for citizens to perceive, but they also provide little
return for a government whose source of political power lies not in authentic democratic
institutions, but rather in the hands of an elite few. Thus, the economic insecurity which comes
from aid dumping works to the detriment of the most marginal and excluded populations in
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goods such as early warning systems and enforced building code measures. By loosening the
budget constraints placed upon government, aid investments should theoretically decrease
disaster mortality. However, Nepalese households and the government alike, expecting external
aid after a disaster, often reduce efforts to mitigate disaster outcomes ex-ante and are likewise
insufficiently vigilant about disaster vulnerability. Data collected by Raschky and Schwindt
reinforces this point: foreign aid is associated with a lower likelihood that countries will
experience any deaths from disasters, but if any deaths do occur, foreign aid is associated with a
stark increase in disaster mortality – especially in the case of floods and earthquakes.245
In Nepal, foreign aid has, however, made some marginal improvements to disaster
reduction measures. It has promoted the development of proper building code standards and
greater safety awareness, especially for hospitals and schools. The World Bank, USAID, and the
Asian Urban Disaster Preparedness Center have all been instrumental in the creation of these
safety plans. However, surveys are now finding that these new building codes are failing largely
due to the incompetency of government regulation and oversight.246 Earthquake-proof buildings
have been constructed (mostly isolated to Kathmandu), yet failure to supervise the quality of
building-reinforcement and corner-cutting to save money have counteracted any potential gains
which these codes could provide.
The potential safety of proper building code enforcement is immense, and must be
considered as a central force in Nepal’s excessive disaster risk. According to Alexander et. al.,
over 95% of all deaths in earthquakes result from building failures.247 There is also a strong link
to be drawn between variations in mortality among different countries and differences in
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building styles, densities of settlements, as well as enforcement of proper building codes.248
Understanding the critical role which structural variations play in Nepal’s seismic earthquake
risk requires that one consider where buildings are likely to fail and also to dissect the root
causes behind this situation (here it is useful to once more refer to the Pressure and Release
model by Blaikie et. al.). The earthquake reinforced buildings which now exist in Kathmandu are
actually very faulty in design and structure in comparison to what is envisioned by the
Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project.249 Though less likely to collapse in an
earthquake, if these buildings do collapse one can expect an even higher mortality rate amongst
inhabitants.250 Improper building codes and lack of enforcement is due largely to the instability
of the government apparatus yet is compounded by unregulated and rampant urbanization
amongst the poorest sectors of society.
The history of Nepal is one of enduring political unrest, inequality, and poor rule of law.
Political and economic power in the region continues to be consolidated by the Hindu caste
system at the expense of the lower caste and ethnic majorities – especially in rural areas.
Therefore, when these conditions come into contact with a natural shock, like that of the
earthquake in 2015, natural disasters are imminent. The vulnerability and physical insecurities of
the rural majorities and urban poor are reproduced through daily acts of exclusion and through
persisting, institutionalized systems of marginalization against those outside the high-caste
structure. The next step in creating a more secure Nepal will be to address the root causes of
disasters. This requires that government and civil society collectively draft a plan of action that
enhances civilian safety across all regions and which also incorporates all sectors in democratic
248

J. Seaman, S. Leivesley and C. Hogg, Epidemiology of Natural Disasters (Basle: Karger, 1984), 10-11.
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Project Completion Report of the Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk
Management Project (Bangkok: Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2000).
250
Philip Keefer, Disastrous Consequences: The Political Economy of Disaster Risk Reduction (Washington D.C.:
The World Bank Group, 2009), 21.
249

106
governance. Perhaps most importantly, governance in Nepal must work to reduce the underlying
pressures of economic stagnation, inequality, and excessive poverty by restructuring the
distribution of wealth and enhancing political participation. The state must address both the
physical hazards of poor building construction alongside the socio-political conditions of
inequality and political inefficiency, otherwise earthquake mitigation measures cannot be
successfully realized in Nepal. Without a serious reformation to the governing apparatus, the
Nepalese people will remain embroiled in a situation of high risk and vulnerability to disaster for
years to come.

Conclusion:
Disasters are highly complex material events inextricably linked to the social perceptions
of a community; they are not products of natural phenomena under the pressures of climate
change. Rather, natural disasters are a manifestation of the deeply-rooted inequalities and social
vulnerabilities felt by any given demographic when a hazard strikes. Therefore, unless one is
capable of understanding the historically-embedded root causes and broader social patterns that
precipitate people’s vulnerability to disaster (these include: economic inequality, unsafe living
conditions, and poignant political marginalization, among many others which have been
addressed throughout this text), it will be impossible to effectively develop a means of
addressing natural disasters in the twenty-first century. International disaster mitigation efforts
must analyze not only disasters in general, but rather go a step further and dissect the underlying
forces that make people and their environment vulnerable to such crises in the first place.
Each case study analyzed here, Haiti, Ethiopia, and Nepal, all experience natural disasters
in a unique context, yet there are indeed some overlapping trends. In weak, underdeveloped
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states such as Nepal or Haiti, disaster prevention and response units are either non-existent or ill
equipped to address the needs and demands of its citizens. In such instances, it is not uncommon
for the corrupt incentives of government officials to also precipitate widespread abuse of hazard
relief aid, exacerbating the outbreak of disaster. Similarly, this analysis has shown that a poor
history of upholding human rights causes many citizens to accept unsafe living conditions and
insecure livelihoods. As a direct consequence, people’s access to the resources necessary for
effective hazard adaptation are often withheld and essential coping mechanisms obstructed.
Likewise, under conditions where resource extraction and excessive industrial development have
degraded the natural environment to a point of severe instability, as is the case in Haiti and
Nepal, hazards such as a monsoon or hurricane can create catastrophic flooding or landslides. In
Ethiopia, the ill-conceived, top-down reconfiguration of land tenure practices compounded by a
long history of ethnic conflict, has meant that droughts can easily escalate into full-blown
disasters. Such patterns are common across the developing world.
As has been shown, historic processes of isolation, oppression, and exploitation,
combined with contemporary international power systems, interact in complex ways to affect
different socioeconomic classes distinctly. The outbreak of disaster thus exposes the moment
when these instabilities come into contact with an environmental hazard. In order to effectively
address such debilitating crises, the international community must begin to take preventative, and
not just reactive measures. Effective action will require that both international institutions and
governments collectively address disasters as a function of the daily risks which people face that
heighten their vulnerability.
In 1990 the United Nations announced the beginning of the International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The focus of this sponsored decade was to create and
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maintain a safer environment by encouraging nation states to share and pool resources, thereby
enhancing access to information, technological expertise, and resilience against severe weather.
One major objective of the IDNDR has been to improve hazard prediction methods, yet this
methodology merely pits attention towards the hazards themselves, rather than towards the
forces which give rise to disasters. While enhanced scientific and financial resources are always
useful in mitigating risks, this limited approach runs the danger of encouraging top-down
development efforts that allow empirical data and science to overshadow the needs and
vulnerabilities of those at greatest risk to disaster.
Many of the current disaster risk reduction measures adopted by the UN, World Bank,
and other multilateral stakeholders are not only expensive, but also entirely overlook the root
causes of disasters themselves. As we have seen in Haiti, it is not merely the hurricane which
gives rise to a natural disaster. Rather, it is Haiti’s entrenched patterns of authoritarian
militarism, severe inequality, and the marginalization of the most vulnerable demographics
which ultimately generate natural disasters from a hazard. If the hazard itself were the root cause
of disaster, Hurricane Matthew and other similar Caribbean storms would have created much
more tragic outcomes in the Dominican Republic and neighboring Cuba. These politically and
economically based patterns of suffering are yet to be effectively acknowledged by the
international community.
However, some progress has indeed been made. Since the 1990s, international efforts at
natural disaster mitigation have been further codified. In 1999 the United Nations drafted a new
mandate to address the impending threat of natural disasters entitled, The International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction. In 2001 this mandate was expanded to serve as the focal point in the UN
system, guaranteeing coordination and synergies among disaster risk reduction activities
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throughout the UN, as well as with regional humanitarian organizations. To quote the Secretary
General, this era marked a newfound focus on disaster risk reduction: "We must, above all, shift
from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Prevention is not only more humane than
cure; it is also much cheaper... Above all, let us not forget that disaster prevention is a moral
imperative, no less than reducing the risks of war".251 In 2015 the Sendai Framework for disaster
reduction was adopted by the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. This
framework is a fifteen-year voluntary, non-binding agreement that delineates a broad, peoplecentered approach to disaster risk reduction. The Sendai Framework marks monumental step
towards alleviating the stresses and strains of people’s vulnerability around the world. The core
focus of this recent mandate includes ensuring that disaster risk reduction (DRR) is applied to
climate change adaptation while also increasing key investments in mitigation efforts such as
building disaster resilient cities, schools, and hospitals, while also strengthening collaboration
throughout the international system and enhancing coordination.252
While the Sendai Framework and other UN mandates are indeed steps in the right
direction, such international developments should be taken with great caution. It is commendable
and certainly a great achievement that the international community is recognizing the sociopolitical roots of natural disasters in the 21st-century, especially as they pertain to economic
inequalities and cultural biases against vulnerable communities. Yet these institutions must be
wary of perpetuating the top-down, developmentalist and aid-centric approach to disaster risk
reduction which has thus far failed to address many of the afflictions underlying people’s
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vulnerability. By keeping DRR policies and discourse isolated amongst the institutions directing
the international policy arena, it is unlikely that people’s vulnerability to disaster will be reduced
in any substantive manner. To effectively address the root causes of natural disasters requires
that vulnerable people’s access to resources are enhanced through changes in the power relations
of society. Currently, those who created this global system of inequality and injustice are
devising the very mechanisms which will supposedly relieve the suffering that their system not
only created, but which they themselves have never experienced. Such an approach isolates the
source of solutions to those at the top of the global power hierarchy. Moving forward, the
international community must recognize that the primary forces behind active relief consist of
grass-roots mobilization. Affected communities must work collectively towards their
empowerment, supporting each other when coping and adapting to environmental changes.
Under the current IDNDR framework, the impacts of disasters can indeed be diminished to a
limited extent. However, as previously noted, by addressing disasters through scientific
modelling and technological adaptations, international DRR agencies focus their efforts
exclusively on the environmental aspects of the problem and isolate solutions.
The case studies developed throughout this discussion have made clear the severe need
for a vulnerability-focused analysis within current international discourses on disaster risk
reduction. The pivotal role which socio-political instabilities and economic inequalities play in
generating the preconditions for disaster cannot be overlooked if the international community is
to reduce the devastating effects of natural disasters in the era of climate change. To address the
anthropogenic roots of natural disasters will require that those involved in disaster mitigation
efforts actively seek to diminish people’s vulnerability through collaborative, cross-sector
engagement from the bottom-up. Domestic and international actors alike must be open to
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changing the processes that put people at risk. This means that the environment cannot be made
safer by technical developments alone. As the perspective put forth in this analysis contends, it is
indeed possible to make the human environment safer. However, this is only achievable when
concrete efforts are made to reduce economic and social inequalities, cultural biases, and
political injustice. The people at risk must be incorporated into the political and economic life of
their nations and encouraged to participate in substantive democratic processes --such is a right
afforded to all humans, not a privilege.
The internationally financed development projects described throughout the case studies
of this discussion, such as USAID agricultural projects in Haiti, economic development
programs in Ethiopia, or earthquake relief efforts in Nepal, are designed and directed by large
international organizations. Inevitably, this means that such projects lack any clear accountability
mechanisms for human rights and environmental standards. These projects, such as dams, mines,
and oil pipelines, are notorious for their environmental and human rights impacts, including the
forced displacement of indigenous people, the poisoning of rivers used for drinking water, the
exacerbation of corruption, and the perpetuation of sexual abuse against women and children by
foreign workers. Thus, the very projects meant to lift people out of poverty often have the
opposite impact. This must change.
Such is not to say that efforts at global development, poverty alleviation, and disaster risk
reduction are futile. Vulnerability can indeed be reduced, but only if aid programs are properly
conceived and implemented so as to actually address the needs of society rather than to preserve
the industry of NGOs and global development agencies. What is needed is substantive
engagement of the masses towards their own empowerment. The social, economic, and political
mechanisms that translate global pressures and unsafe conditions into disasters can be changed
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and even reversed if the people become active participants in the development of their own
societies. Like all aspects of the human condition, the transnational pressures which create
vulnerability should be viewed as flexible concepts, not as immutable and inevitable elements of
society. Ideally, society will work to enhance the links between popular culture and bureaucracy,
strengthening the management of high-risk regions so as to incorporate structural as well as
nonstructural measures for disaster risk reduction.
Effective disaster management efforts will be pointless if projects continue to be based on
a hierarchical model that overlooks the needs of the communities they seek to serve. Disasters
can be reduced only by freeing people from the socio-political and economic constraints they
face in everyday life. These root causes must be given the same priority as more technical and
scientific approaches to disaster risk management. Therefore, substantive disaster risk reduction
measures are only obtainable if the implementation of DRR policies are balanced in a
participatory system that fully acknowledges the diversity of state and non-state actors
concerned, working to empower local communities and strengthen democratic institutions across
the world. Progress has indeed been made, yet still the international community overlooks the
important implications which political and economic forces play in the overall resilience of a
population. Natural disasters are indeed one of the greatest threats to human security in the
modern era. If the global community is to effectively address this imminent threat, a more
holistic, human rights-focused, and inclusive approach to disaster risk management is necessary.
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